The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small Businesses by Lavelle, Lisa A.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 66 | Issue 4 Article 12
April 2014
The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate
Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small
Businesses
Lisa A. Lavelle
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lisa A. Lavelle, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only
to Disable Small Businesses, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1135 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol66/iss4/12
The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate
Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small
Businesses?
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),1 signed
into law on July 26, 1990, has been heralded by its proponents as
the "Emancipation Proclamation"2 for individuals with disabilities,
and criticized by its opponents as the "Lawyer's Employment
Law."' The ADA's opponents fear that it will flood the courts
with litigation and impose financial burdens which will destroy
small businesses.4 The duties imposed under Title I of the ADA
will undoubtedly have an impact on small businesses, and the
terms of the Act are likely to result in litigation, as have all civil
rights laws, and indeed most legislation. Yet, these worries have
been to some degree exaggerated5 and are outweighed signifi-
1 42 U.S.C.S. § 21,101 (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
2 Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 4 U. ILL L REV. 923,
923 (1989). See Elsasser, Senate Ok's Rights Bill for Disabled, Chi. Trib., Sept. 8, 1989, § 1,
at 1, col. 2; Horvath, Disabled Rights Bill Praised and Feared, Newsday, Sept. 9, 1989, at 2,
col. 3.
3 Review and Outlook. The Lawyers' Employment Act, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at
A18, col. 1. See also What's Wrong with the New Civil Rights Bill, Wash. Post, Sept. 2,
1989, at A23, col. 3 (accusing the ADA of encouraging adversarial relationships and
litigation as opposed to cooperative efforts to eliminate discrimination); Tucker, supra
note 2 at 929.
4 135 CONG. REc. 10,773 (1989) (statement of Sen. Helms (R-N.C.)). See, e.g.,
Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers and Dream for Law-
yers?, 64 ST. JOHN's L REV. 229 (1990).
5 Tucker, supra note 2, at 930 (employers who currently employ workers with dis-
abilities report that there is no significant cost difference in hiring individuals with dis-
abilities as opposed to individuals who do not have disabilities). A 1982 study showed
that only 22% of employees with disabilities required accommodations, 51% of which
were achieved at no additional cost, 30% of which were at a cost of less than $500.
Also, the cost of insurance for the employer did not increase when individuals with
disabilities were hired. Id. See also I BERKELEY PLANNING ASSOCS., A STUDY OF ACCOM-
MODATIONS PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES BY FEDERAL CoNTRAcTORS 20, 29
(1982); LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., INC., THE ICD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AmERI-
CANS 9 (1987) (Study No. 864009); Hiring the Handicapped. Overcoming Physical & Psycho-
logical Barriers in the Job Market, 1986 J. AM. INS., at 13, 17; Nathanson, The Disabled
Employee: Separating Myth from Fact, HARV. Bus. REV., May-june 1977, at 6; Comment,
Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61
CEO. LJ. 1501, 1513 (1973).
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candy by the benefits of the ADA6.
The ADA is designed to establish a "clear and comprehensive
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability."7 Congress
found that some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities and that discrimination against such individ-
uals is a serious and pervasive social problem.' Furthermore, per-
sons with disabilities have often had no legal recourse against dis-
crimination.9 Prompted by these findings, Congress created the
ADA to prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities
and to establish a means of enforcing the mandate.1"
Individuals with disabilities have faced various and sometimes
unique forms of discrimination ranging from outright exclusion to
the discriminatory effects of architecture, transportation, and com-
munication barriers. They have been subjected to unequal treat-
ment and rejegated to an inferior and politically powerless posi-
tion in society. This treatment is based upon characteristics which
are beyond the control of individuals with disabilities and
stereotypic assumptions which are not truly indicative of the indi-
vidual abilities of persons with disabilities to participate in and
contribute to our society.11 Congress created the ADA to combat
those stereotypic assumptions and to enable Americans with dis-
abilities to participate in and contribute to society according to
their abilities.
A part of the congressional findings regarding the ADA,
based on statistics from a 1989 report of the Census Bureau,
indicates that the numbers of men and women with disabilities in
the workforce is declining as is the earned income of those indi-
viduals.12 These statistics are a product not only of discrimina-
6 See generally Tucker, supra note 2, at 930-31.
7 S. REP. No. 558, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990).
8 Id. at 3. Congress did not intend the term "Americans" to imply that the ADA
applies only to United States citizens. The Act applies to all individuals with disabilities
regardless of citizenship, status, or nationality. 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,592 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.1(a)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
9 S. REP. No. 558, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990). Individuals with disabilities have
been protected by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1988). The
Rehabilitation Act limits protection to individuals with disabilities who work for employ-
ers who receive federal financial assistance or who were government contractors. 29
U.S.C. §§ 793-94.
10 S. REP. No. 558, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990).
11 Id. at 3-4.
12 For instance, in 1988, only 23.4% of men with disabilities worked full-time (down
from 29.8% in 1981) and 13.1% of women with disabilities worked full-time (up from
11.4% in 1981), and the earnings of men with disabilities fell from 77% of what all
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tion in hiring practices, but also of a lack of equal opportunity in
promotions and privileges in 'employment. Congress therefore
designed Title I of the ADA to remedy these pervasive discrimina-
tory employment practices.
Title I of the ADA provides that no employer covered by the
Act"3 shall "discriminate against a qualified individual with a dis-
ability because of the disability of. such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." "
Section 12,112(b) defines the term "discrimination," and in-
cludes seven specified actions which are discriminatory. 5 This
Note concerns primarily the fifth act, or nonact, 6 ' which includes
workers made in 1981 to 64% of what all workers made in 1988 while the earnings of
women with disabilities fell from 69% 6f all in 1981 to 62% of all in 1988. Tucker,
supra note 2, at 926. See Study on Disabled and Jobs Finds Work and Good Pay Are Scarce,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1989, at A22, col. 3; Hey, Study finds Workers with Disabilities Losing
Ground, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 17, 1989, at 7, col. 2. See also 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578,
8,579 (1991) (Introduction to Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis for proposed regu-
lations implementing Title I of the ADA, to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991); DIGEST OF DATA ON PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, June 1984 (using a 1978 Social Security Administration survey report-
ing the unemployment rate of disabled individuals).
13 The ADA applies to any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or
joint labor-management committee." An employer is generally defined as a person en-
gaged in industry affecting commerce who employs 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,111(5)(A) (Law. Co-op.' Supp. Feb. 1991). The ADA excludes the
United States, a corporation Wholly-owned by the United States, an Indian tribe, a bona
fide private club, and for the first two years after -the effective date of the act, any em-
ployer who has less than 25 employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of that person. 42
U.S.C.S. § 12,111(5XB). This exclusion is consistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
14 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,112(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
15 Discrimination includes: (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying an individual be-
cause of a disability in a manner which adversely affects the, opportunities of that per-
son; (2) entering into contractual relationships or arrangements which result in subjecting
the disabled individual to prohibited discrimination; (3) using administrative standards or
methods that have the- effect of discrimination or that perpetuate discrimination; (4)
denying equal jobs or benefits to a person because of that person's relationship to or
association with a disabled person; "(5) not making, reasonable accommodations or deny-
ing employment opportunities because cof the need to accommodate; (6) using qualifica-
tion standards, tests or selection criteria, not job-related or necessary to the business,
which tend to screen out disabled individuals; and (7) failing to select or administer
such tests in a manner which accurately reflects the abilities of applicants or employees
with impaired sensory, manual or speaking skills rather than reflecting the disability it-
self. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,112(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
16 The duty to provide reasonable accommodation is an affirmative duty, thus the
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(1) an employer's failure to provide reasonable accommodations
when such accommodations do not impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business, or (2) an employer's denial of job
opportunities to an individual with disabilities where the employer
bases the denial on the need to accommodate the individual.'"
This provision has caused much of the discussion and controversy
surrounding the enactment of the ADA." Although Congress
provided definitions of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship," those definitions are broad and require further inter-
pretation. The potentially broad implications of the employer's
duty under the ADA worry small businesses, and the uncertain
meaning of the terms provoked some to call this Act a "lawyer's
dream." 19
This Note explores the scope of an employer's duty to pro-
vide reasonable accommodations to employees or prospective em-
ployees with disabilities and estimates when that duty will cause
an undue hardship on the operation of the business. Part I of
this Note explores the scope of persons affected by Title I of the
ADA, specifically, those covered as employers and individuals with
disabilities. Parts II and III examine the meanings of "reasonable
accommodation" and "undue hardship" respectively, focusing on
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's proposed regu-
lations implementing Title I of the ADA (ADA regulations),"0
and the use and interpretation of these and related terms under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.2 These parts also examine some
state statutes which use similar language and case law interpreting
these statutes.22 Part IV concludes that the benefits to Americans
with disabilities provided by the ADA far outweigh the costs to
employers who will no longer be able to exclude individuals with
disabilities from their employ.
failure to act is discriminatory inaction.
17 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) & (B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
18 See generaUy supra notes 2-4.
19 Elsasser, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting Sen. David Pryor (D. Ark.)).
20 Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg.
8,578 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1988).
22 Congress has clearly stated that the ADA is based on the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and should be interpreted accordingly. However, the Supreme Court of the United
States has had limited opportunity to interpret the relevant provisions of the Rehabilita-
tion Act and the lower federal court sometimes arrive at conflicting results due to the
fact specific nature of the law. Many state courts have much more experience with dis-
ability law, especially in the private sector. Thus, it is beneficial to consider state court
decisions where the terms of the state statutes are sufficiently similar to the ADA.
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I. WHO HAS THE DUTY TO WHOM?
While Congress purportedly based the reasonable accommo-
dation section of the ADA on the Rehabilitation Act,23 the ADA
is a much broader emancipation for individuals with disabilities.
This is primarily due to the broad definition of "employer" con-
tained in the ADA and also in part to the definition of "dis-
ability." The broad scope of the Act is the source of the contro-
versy surrounding burdens feared by businesses.
A. Covered entities under the ADA
The ADA creates a field of employment opportunity for qual-
ified individuals with disabilities that knows almost no bounds.
The Act tries to ensure that social prejudice and ignorance do
not limit individuals with disabilities in employment opportunities.
Qualified individuals with disabilities can now enter the private
sector without fear of discrimination or at least with a means of
recourse against any discrimination they might encounter. Until
the ADA was enacted, this guaranteed protection existed only un-
der the Rehabilitation Act and some state laws. Under the Reha-
bilitation Act, the protection applies only when employers receive
federal financial assistance, or are government contractors. 4 The
Rehabilitation Act provides in part that:
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the Unit-
ed States,... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.25
Furthermore, "[s]mall providers are not required ... to make
significant structural alterations to their existing facilities for the
23 Lindsay, Discrimination against the Disable& The Impact of the New Federal Legisla-
tion, 15 EMp. REL. tJ. 333, 334 (Winter 1989-90) (report issued by the Senate Labor
Committee indicates that the ADA is modeled after the Rehabilitation Act as it has been
interpreted by courts and federal agencies). The regulations implementing the ADA are
also modeled on the regulations implementing section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act, as
amended. 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (proposed
Feb. 28, 1991).
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 793-94 (1988).
25 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
1991]
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purpose of assuring program accessibility, if alternative means of
providing the services are available."2 6
The ADA, on the other hand, prohibits similar discrimina-
tion, but extends the prohibition to employers within the private
sector who do not receive federal assistance or are not govern-
ment contractors. 27 The ADA completely excludes small employ-
ers, those having fifteen or less employees. 2' Essentially, the
ADA has created the possibility of employment for individuals
with disabilities in nearly all employment areas, not only those
related to the federal government.
Prior to the ADA, individuals with disabilities seeking jobs
from employers not covered by the Rehabilitation Act had to rely
on state laws for protection against discrimination.29 State anti-
discrimination legislation varies regarding both the scope of em-
ployers covered and the individuals protected. While most states
have broad anti-discrimination laws in this area which apply to the
private employer,"° the laws vary regarding the size of employers
subject to the laws' requirements. Some states do not exempt
small employers at all, while others have a lower minimum num-
ber of employees for exclusion." Fourteen states include all em-
ployers in their disability laws, but most of the others exclude
businesses with less than fifteen employees.32
The enactment of the ADA does not affect the rights and
remedies available to individuals with disabilities under current
26 Id.
27 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
28 Also, for the first two years after the Act becomes enforceable, employers with
less than twenty-five employees are excluded from compliance. See supra note 13.
29 E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12,921, 12,932, 12,940, 12,994 (West 1980 & Supp.
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 721 et seq. (1985 & Supp. 1990) (very similar to
ADA); Michigan Handicapper's Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1101
(West 1985 & Supp. 1990) (also similar); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2 to 28-1-7 (1987 &
Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.34 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (similar to ADA). See Sing-
er, Employment Rights of the Handicapped under State Law, 1983 L NOTES 115 (provides
cites to all but fourteen- state disability laws).
Attempts to obtain relief under the common law or the United States Constitution
have been generally unsuccessful. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979); Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982).
See Chin, Discrimination Against the Handicapped.: The Duty of Reasonable Accommodation,
1989 N.Y.U. 42D ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. § 14.02.
30 Frierson, Determining Coverage Under the Handicapped Employment Laws, 40 LABOR
UJ. 630, 630 (1989) (the laws of Alabama and Arkansas apply only to government units,
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federal and state statutes and common law."3 As stated in the
proposed ADA regulations, the ADA "does not invalidate or limit
the remedies, rights, and procedures" of the law of any jurisdic-
tion "that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of
individuals with disabilities" than the ADA provides.3 4 Thus, an
employer may not use in his defense a law which imposes a lesser
standard than the ADA. On the other hand, the employer may
not use the ADA as a defense for failing to meet a higher stan-
dard of another law to which the employer is subject. 5 The ap-
pendix to the proposed regulations states, as an example, that the
ADA would not be a defense to an employer who failed to collect
information required to satisfy the affirmative action requirements
of section 503, of the Rehabilitation Act.- Nevertheless, if anoth-
er Federal law requires a challenged action, or prohibits an action
which would otherwise be required by the ADA, the employer
may be able to use that law as a defense.3 ' Furthermore, the on-
ly remedies available to individuals seeking redress under Title I
of the ADA are the remedies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.8
B. Who are the Disabled?
The classification of individuals with disabilities under the
ADA is very similar to that under the Rehabilitation Act. The
ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such impairment." 9 An individual must satis-
33 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Law and Explanation, 320 Lab. L. Rep.
(CCH), 43 (No. 395, July 31, 1990) [hereinafter Law and Explanation]. Agencies enforcing
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA should make efforts to avoid inconsistent and con-
flicting standards. Id. Also, the provision in the ADA concerning employees in food han-
dling positions, infra note 35, contains a'provision which makes clear that state and local
public health laws and regulations are not preempted by the ADA. Id. at 39.
34 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,592 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 163 0.1(c)(2))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
35 Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.1(a)).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Law and Explanation, supra note 33, at 39. "[It is probable that the' simultaneous
broadening of anti-discrimination coverage by Congress and the Supreme Court's narrow-
ing of legal redress for victims of civil right's violations, in almost contrary ways will ef-
fect how lawyers and advocates attempt to -represent their clients and promote legal
change." Parry, 1989 and Perons with Disabilities: A Year of Change without Real Progress
Overall, 13 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISAB. L. REP. 498, 498 (1989).
39 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,102(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991). See 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578,
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fy at least one of these parts in order to be an individual with a
disability under the ADA.4"
To determine whether an individual satisfies one part of the
definition, courts and employers will have to understand what
each part means. Each part contains terms which require further
clarification. The courts and the federal agencies responsible for
enforcing the ADA will likely interpret the Act in accordance with
the ADA regulations.41 Consistent with legislative intent, the
ADA regulations are modeled after the regulations implementing
the Rehabilitation Act (Rehabilitation Act regulations) set by the
Departments of Justice, Health & Human Services, and Education
as well as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Department of Labor.4 2 The proposed ADA reg-
ulations also define terms not previously explained by the Rehabil-
itation Act regulations such as "substantially limits," "essential
functions," and "reasonable accommodation."
43
In drafting the ADA regulations, the EEOC used the Rehabili-
tation Act regulations and case law to establish parameters which
they intended to serve as guidelines for the case by case inquiries
that determinations under the ADA may require. 4 It is therefore
useful for courts and employers to reference both the ADA regu-
lations and the Rehabilitation Act regulations and case law when
confronted with issues under the ADA.
Both sets of regulations address the three prongs of the defi-
nition of "disability." The first prong of the definition, a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
an individual's major life activities, presents three interpretive hur-
dles: "physical or mental impairment," "substantially limits," and
"major life activity." According to the ADA regulations, "physical
or mental impairment" means
8,587 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 163 0 .2(g)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). Cf. 29
U.S.C. § 706(8XB) (1988) ("individual with handicap" includes "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment.").
40 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,592 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(g))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
41 Id.
42 This is the intent of the House Committee on Education and Labor as stated in
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 50 (1990). See also Frierson, supra
note 30, at 631.
43 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,592 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 163 0 .2(g))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
44 Id.
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(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the follow-
ing body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retar-
dation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.'
This interpretation is consistent with the Rehabilitation Act regula-
tions.4" The ADA regulations are also consistent with the Reha-
bilitation Act regulations regarding "major life activities." "Major
life activities" includes functions such as "caring for oneself, per-
forming manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning and working."4" This list is not exhaustive.4
While consistent with the ADA definitions of the previous
two terms, the Rehabilitation Act regulations do not adequately
define "substantially limits." This term is essential to any determi-
nation that an individual has a disability. For, although an individ-
ual may have one or more impairments, the impairment, or the
combination of impairments, does not rise to the level of a dis-
ability unless it substantially limits one or more of the individual's
major life activities.49 Under the ADA regulations, "substantially
limits" means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
45 Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(h)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
46 The ADA regulations state in the Appendix that the term adopts the Rehabilita-
tion Act regulation at 34 C.F.R. pt. 104 (1990). 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,592 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(i)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). Under the Rehabilitation
Act regulations, the term "physical or mental impairment" includes "any physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more
of the body's systems (including the reproductive and the 'skin' systems) and any mental
or psychological disorder." See Department of Justice Regulations, 28 C.F.IL § 41.31(b)(1)
(1990); EEOC Regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.701(a), 702(b) (1990); Department of Edu-
cation Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 104.3 (1990); Department of Health & Human Services
Regulations, 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1990). See also Lindsay, supra note 23, at 336.
47 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,587 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(i)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991). -The Rehabilitation Act defines "major life activity" in the same
terms. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31 (b)(2) (1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(c) (1990); 45 C.F.R. §
84.3jX2)(ii) (1990). A similar definition of "life activities" is available at 41 C.F.R. § 60-
741, App. A (1990).
48 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,592 (1991) (to be codified-at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(i)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991). Others may include sitting, standing, lifting and reaching. Id.
49 Id. at 8,593 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.20)).
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person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or dura-
don under which an individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration
under which the average person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.'
For example, a paraplegic is unable to walk and therefore is sub-
stantially limited in the major life activity of walking. Similarly, a
person who needs medication or enabling devices to perform a
major life activity is significantly restricted in that activity. For in-
stance, an individual who needs prosthetic devices to walk, or a
diabetic who needs insulin regularly to prevent lapsing into a
coma are significantly restricted. 1
However, if the impairment limits the individual in a way that
brings that person to the level of an average individual, then the
individual is not substantially limited. 2 For example, if the indi-
vidual formerly had exceptionally keen eyesight, and the impair-
ment limits him or her to an average range of vision, that person
is not substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing.
The ADA regulations further provide a list of factors for
courts and employers to consider in determining whether an indi-
vidual is substantially limited in a major life activity. They should
consider:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected per-
manent or long term impact of or resulting from the impair-
ment.
53
The term "duration" refers to the length of time an impairment
persists, and "impact" refers to the residual effects of the impair-
ment.5 4 For example, a broken collar bone which takes three
weeks to heal is an impairment of limited duration. But if the
bone heals improperly, the impairment may have the impact of
permanent decrease in the range of arm mobility.
After lengthy discussion and dispute, Congress concluded that
this part of the disability definition in the ADA includes individu-
50 Id. at 8,587 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(jX1)).
51 Id. at 8,593 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(0)).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 8,587 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2()(2)).
54 Id. at 8,593 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.20)).
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als infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).5"
"[A] person infected with the [HIV virus] is covered under the
first prong of the definition of the term 'disability' because of a
substantial limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relation-
ships." 5
6
Although the Rehabilitation Act regulations do not generally
address the definition of "substantially limits," they do address the
term when it applies to the major life activity of working. Under
the Rehabilitation Act the "phrase 'substantially limits' means the
degree that the impairment affects employability. An individual
with a disability who is likely to experience difficulty in securing,
retaining, or advancing in employment would be considered sub-
stantially limited."
5 7
The ADA regulations clarify this area stating that when con-
sidering the major life activity of "working:"
(i) The term "substantially limits" means significant restricted
[sic] in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average
person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The
inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.'
Courts and employers determining the issue of whether an indi-
vidual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working
should also consider the following factors:
55 However, the ADA contains a provision whereby employers of individuals en-
gaged in food handling services will not be required to hire individuals with infectious
diseases which can be transmitted to others through the handling of foods, the threat of
which cannot be eliminated through reasonable accommodations. The Secretary of
Health and Human Services is to establish and continuously update a list of diseases
covered by this exemption. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,113(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991). .Plac-
ing the disease on the list does not automatically exempt an employer from complying
with the ADA, however, for the parties in question will still have to make determinations
as to disability, reasonable accommodation, and undue hardship. 136 CONG. REc. H4598
(daily ed. July 12, 1990) (joint Explanatory Statement, Report 101-596). It is yet to be
seen whether AIDS will be included in the list. 136 CONG. REC. S9538-9540 (daily ed.
July, 11, 1990) (remarks of Mr. Hatch).
56 Report from the Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 52 (1990) (noting statement of the Department of Justice re-
garding the same definition under the Rehabilitation Act in "Application of Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act to HIV-Infected Individuals," September 27, 1988, at 9-11). See
also 136 CONG. Ec. H2442 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (remarks of Mr. Weiss).
57 Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, 41
C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (interpreting § 793, or § 503, of the Rehabilitation Act).
58 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,587 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(jX3))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
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(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reason-
able access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment and the number of jobs utilizing
similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geo-
graphical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (class or jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment, and the number and types of other
jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skins or abilities,
within that geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in
various classes).'
For example, a person with a fear of heights may not be able
to work as an accountant on the top floor of the Sears Tower,
but could work as an accountant in other offices. Therefore, that
person is not substantially limited in the major life activity of
working. Furthermore, an individual is not substantially limited in
working because he or she is no longer able to perform a special-
ized job or profession requiring extraordinary skill, prowess, or
talent.6 ° Thus, an opera singer whose voice changes as a result
of a throat ailment may not be able to gain employment as an
opera singer any longer, but he or she is not substantially limited
in working merely because he or she can no longer perform that
chosen specialty. The range of jobs that the former opera singer
is unable to perform is narrow. The former singer can apply the
opera training to other positions in the same class (administrator
or critic, perhaps). The same applies to professional athletes and
specialized surgeons who sustain injuries which end their special-
ized careers (for example, serious hand injuries to quarterbacks
and brain surgeons). Each can apply their skill and knowledge to
some other aspect of the field, such as coaching or teaching. And
because the individuals are not limited in other major life activi-
ties, they can gain employment in other classes of jobs as well.61
On the other hand, the limitation in working does not have
to be complete.6 2 An individual will be substantially limited in
59 Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(jX3)(ii)).
60 Id. at 8,593 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(jX3)).
61 Id. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986); Jasany v. United States
Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp.
1088 (D. Haw. 1980), iacated sub nom. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) § 32,199 (D. Haw. 1981).
62 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,593 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.20)(3))
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the major life activity of working if the individual is significantly
restricted in a whole class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
many classes.63 For instance, a person with asthma who is re-
stricted from heavy labor jobs, which is a whole class of jobs, is
substantially limited in working. Similarly, a person who is claus-
trophobic may be unable to ride elevators. Therefore, that person
would be restricted from a broad range of jobs in many classes
which require the individual to work in offices near the top of
high rise buildings. That person also is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working.
Essentially, the question of whether a condition is a disability
depends on the effect it has on the individual's lifestyle and work
and whether it limits a major life activity." When the conditions,
manner, or duration under, which a person can perform a major
life activity is substantially limited, that person has a disability
under the ADA. 65 Both the cause and the ability to mitigate the
effect of the disability are irrelevant to the determination of
whether a person has a disability.66 For instance, even though a
hearing aid will improve the hearing of some people, and even
though medication can control the limiting effects of diabetes and
other diseases, the ADA still covers individuals with these disabili-
ties. 67
However, mere cuts and bruises or minor and temporary
problems, such. as a sprained finger, are not disabilities. Simple
physical characteristics such as eye or hair color, a large nose, or
crooked teeth also are not disabilities. Nonetheless, the ADA is
expected to receive liberal construction in even this area, as the
proponents of the Act asserted that the "physically unattractive
members of our society" deserve protection.61 The broad defini-
tion of disability allows this liberal construction. For instance,
while a person with temporary problems is not limited in a major
life function, employers may perceived that person as having such
a limitation, and he or she therefore has a disability under one of
the other prongs of the definition. 69
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
63 Id.
64 See supra note 47.
65 Law-and Explanation, supra note 33, at 12.
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 336-37. See also Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment
Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L REV. 2035 (1985).
69 For instance a burn victim with severe disfigurement, may be regarded as having
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Thus, if an individual has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits a major life activity, that individual has a
disability under the first part of the ADA's definition. But, if the
person does not fit this part of the definition, he or she still may
be an individual with a disability under one of the other two
parts of the definition.
The second prong of the disability definition includes a per-
son having a record of an impairment. Having a record of such
impairment means having a history of, or having been classified
as having, a mental or physical disability which substantially limits
a major life activity."' This classification would include, for exam-
ple, an individual with a history of a heart condition or mental ill-
ness. To satisfy this prong of the definition, an employer must
have relied on records, such as education, medical, or employ-
ment records, which indicate, correctly or not, that the individual
has or has had an impairment which substantially limits a major
life activity." This section has been incorporated into the ADA,
as it was in the Rehabilitation Act, because attitudes in the
workforce toward a person with a previous disability might result
in the individual having difficulty securing, retaining, or advancing
in employment.
For similar reasons, the category of individuals regarded as
having a disability was added to the Rehabilitation Act and is in-
an impairment and thus be substantially limited in the life activity of working due to
social or employer attitudes, even though the disfigurement, absent the disabling percep-
tion, does not limit such activity. Law and Explanation, supra note 33, at 14.
70 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,587 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(k)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991). This is consistent with the Rehabilitation Act regulations. See 28
C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(3) (1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(d) (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)
(1990). According to 41 C.F.R. § 60-741, App. A (1990), this phrase includes individuals
who have completely recovered from mental or physical impairment
California law has a similarly broad definition of handicap, at least in terms of the
manner in which the California courts have interpreted ANN. CAL. Gov. CODE § 12920
(West 1980 & Supp. 1991). In Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment and Hous.
Comm., 32 Cal. 3d 603, 651 P.2d 1151, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1982), the California Su-
preme Court found that high blood pressure is a disability under that law. In dismissing
the argument that only currently disabling problems are covered, the court stated that
"[tio limit 'handicap' to present disabilities would .. . proscribe discrimination based on
current, manifest, physical dysfunction while allowing exclusion on the basis of condi-
tions-like high blood pressure-that may handicap in the future but have no presently
disabling effect." 651 P.2d at 1155.
71 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,593-94 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(k))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991). The fact that an individual is considered "disabled" for the
purposes of another law does not mean that the individual automatically is considered as
having a disability for the purposes of the ADA. Id.
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cluded in the ADA.7" This category includes an individual who:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substan-
tially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered enti-
ty as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of oth-
ers toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraphs (h)(1)
or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as hav-
ing such an impairment."
The first part of this category includes a person who has an
impairment which is not substantially limiting, but is treated by
an employer as if the impairment were so."4 In such cases, an
employer may offer an accommodation for the individual's impair-
ment when no accommodation is necessary.75 For instance, an
employer may reassign a laborer with a limp to lighter duty when
in fact the limp does not affect ihe individual's work. This individ-
ual is regarded as having a disability.
The next category of individuals regarded as having disabili-
ties are those who are substantially limited, but only because of
other people's attitudes toward their condition or impairment. 6
This includes individuals who have disfigurements or scars or
other noticeable characteristics. Employers may discriminate
against such individuals due to unfounded fears thai the reactions
of customers or co-workers may be damaging to business or pro-
ductivity. While the individual is not limited in any major life
activity, the employer regards the individual as having a disability
and acts according to that perception.77
Finally, in the third category of individuals regarded as having
disabilities are individuals who are believed to have disabilities,
but, in fact, do not.7" For instance, if an employer discriminates
72 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,102(2)C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
73 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,587-88 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2())
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991). This is consistent with the Rehabilitation Act regulations. See
28 C.F.R. § 41.31(bX4) (1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(e) (1990); 41 C.F.R. § 60-741, App.
A (1990); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(jX2)(iv) (1990).
74 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,594 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(1)) (pro-
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against an employee based on an unfounded rumor that the em-
ployee has hepatitis or is mentally unstable, that individual is re-
garded as having a disability. The employer has discriminated
against the individual on the basis of that disability.
79
To consider an individual as having a disability under this
third part of the definition, the ADA assumes that employers
similar to the discriminating employer (same class of jobs or geo-
graphic area) would also regard the individual as having a disabili-
ty.8 0 For instance, suppose a farmer will not hire people with
red hair as field laborers because he fears that absences for severe
sunburn will decrease productivity. The farmer regards people
with red hair as having a disability when in fact they do not have
a physical or mental impairment, and they are not limited in any
major life activity. Under the ADA, all farmers in the area are
presumed to regard red haired people as having a disability. This
is a necessary provision because an employer would otherwise be
able to use discriminatory disqualifying criteria so long as other
employers in the industry or area would not use the same criteria
and would .hire the individual."' If other similar employers would
hire the individual, then that individual would not be limited in
the major life activity of working. If other farmers in the area
would hire a red haired individual, then that individual is not
substantially limited in working. Then the individual could not, by
definition, be discriminated against on the basis of disability. It is
therefore necessary to make the above assumption. 2
Through these last categories of "disabilities," it is possible
for an individual who does not have a physical or mental impair-
ment to be discriminated against on the basis of disability. Obvi-
ously, this broad definition of disability and the potential breadth
of construction will present employers and practitioners with
some difficulty in deciding who will be covered by the definition.
Furthermore, the question of whether an individual has a disabili-
ty is closely related to the issue of whether he or she is "other-
wise qualified" for the position sought. Thus, courts and employ-
ers will also have to consider the need for accommodation when
deciding the issue of disability. This aspect of disability is dis-





83 See infra Part II.
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Nonetheless, the ADA has expressly limited the definition in
some areas.' For instance, it does not cover individuals current-
iy engaged in the use of illegal drugs8 5 as did the Rehabilitation
Act.86 Also excluded from the scope of "disability" are homosex-
uality or bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism or other sexual
disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania.8
7
These conditions do not limit major life activities within the
meaning of the ADA. 8 Furthermore, temporary, non-chronic im-
pairments of short duration and little or no long-term impact
such as broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis,
and influenza are not disabilities.8 9 Obesity is also not a disability
except in rare and limiting circumstances. 90
As has been noted, the ADA definition of disability is similar
to the section 706(7) definition under the Rehabilitation Act.91
Sections 793 and 794,92 which use the section 706(7) definition,
84 The regulations list the exceptions io the definition at 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588-
89 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.3) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
85 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,114(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
86 Cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act have held that individuals with drug and
alcohol addiction have a disability. Eg., Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1990). See
Lindsay, supra note 23, at 337. However, the Rehabilitation Act was also amended to
exclude current drug or alcohol abusers. 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1988), as amended by Pub. L
No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 (1986) (effective October 21, 1986). However, this amendment
only applies to §§ 793 and 794, not to § 791.
Another amendment excluded persons with infectious diseases who would constitute
a "direct threat to the health or safety" of others. 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1988), as amended by
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (ef-
fective March 22, 1988).
87 S. REP. No. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 511 (1989), 135 CONG. REc. 10,954,
10,961 (1989). That these conditions are enumerated does not mean that some which
are not mentioned are necessarily covered. 135 CONG. REc. 10,785 (1989) (remarks of
Mr. Armstrong). See also Tucker, supra note 2, at 925-26. -
88 Of course, if people within the class of enumerated exclusions also have a cov-
ered disability, they cannot be discriminated against using this provision as a pretext to
discrimination based on the disability.
89 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,592 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(g))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
90 Id.
91 For a discussion of particular disabilities see 97 A.LR. Fed. 40 (1990), discussing
musculoskeletal disabilities or impairments, sensory function disabilities, cardiovascular
and circulatory disabilities, neurological disorders, respiratory impairments, contagious dis-
eases, congenital birth defects, kidney impairments, diabetes, tobacco smoke sensitivity,
unspecified transitory illness, mental or psychological disorders, and drug and alcohol
addiction. See also Haines, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of
"Handicapped Individual" for Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and for
Various State Equal Employment Opportunity Statutes, 16 LoY. LA.L. REV. 527 (1983) (ex-
ploring the ambiguity of the term "handicapped").
92 This section was previously section 504 and has been widely written about as
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have been the subject of extensive litigation. The results of this
litigation have been incorporated into the ADA regulations93 and
will apply to the interpretation of "disability" under the ADA. 4
Many state disability statutes also use a similar definition of dis-
ability or handicap, although the state courts and lower federal
courts tend not to be as liberal in their interpretations of the
term.95 The prior treatment of the term will be useful to those
concerned and to the courts.
Ultimately courts will have to decide the question of who has
a disability on a case by case basis. As a district court noted in
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall:'6
the real focus must be on the individual job seeker, and not
solely on the impairment or the perceived impairment. This
necessitates a case-by-case determination of whether the impair-
ment or perceived impairment of a rejected, qualified job seek-
er, constitutes, for that individual, a substantial handicap to
employment.97
II. THE DUTY TO REASONABLY ACCOMMODATE
Title I of the ADA outlaws many forms of discrimination
based upon disability.9" The broad language used to define dis-
crimination under the ADA will both protect individuals with dis-
abilities in more ways and will reciprocally impose a broader bur-
den on employers than has any prior federal law, including the
section 504, but this Note will refer to the section under its amended section number,
794.
93 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630) (proposed Feb.
28, 1991).
94 See Tucker, supra note 2, at 925.
95 Frierson, supra note 30, at 630.
96 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980), vacated sub nom. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Donovan,
27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 32,199 (D. Haw. 1981).
97 Id. at 1100. Black provides one of the most comprehensive studies of the term
"handicap" under the Rehabilitation -Act. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
disapproved of the language in Black stating that "the court did not adequately analyze
the focus and relationship of the definitional elements of the statute--impairment, sub-
stantial limitation of major life activity and qualified person." Jasany v. United States
Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985) (the court agreed with the result in
Black and with the focus on the individual job seeker, but disapproved of the scope of
the analysis).
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the definition of "handicapped
individual" under the Rehabilitation Act in School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273 (1987) (whether a person afflicted with the contagious disease of tuberculosis is
"handicapped" under § 504).
98 See supra note 15.
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Rehabilitation Act. This Note focuses on discrimination based
upon an individual with a disability's need for reasonable accom-
modations. Under the ADA, the term "discriminate" includes:
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individ-
ual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the busi-
ness of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a dis-
ability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered
entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or
mental impairments of the employee or applicant.9
For an individual to receive protection from these types of dis-
crimination under the ADA, an individual with a disability must
be qualified for the job with or without reasonable accommoda-
tions."°° This means that if an individual can perform the essen-
tial functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, 1°1 the
person qualifies for the job. If the individual qualifies for the job,
the employer must provide the reasonable accommodation and
cannot deny employment because of the disability or the need for
such accommodation. 10 2
These terms present some interpretive hurdles. Specifically,
employers and courts will have to determine who is "otherwise
qualified." To determine that, they will have to decide the pre-
requisite job qualifications, the "essential functions" of the job,
and the "reasonable accommodations" that might qualify an indi-
vidual with a disability for the position. Then the employer must
examine the available accommodations to determine which ones
the employer can reasonably provide.
The proposed ADA regulations and courts' interpretations of
99 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,112 (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
100 This language was also used under the Rehabilitation Act in Coley v. Secretary of
Army, 689 F. Supp. 519, 521-22 (D.C Md. 1987), holding that a person who can per-
form the essential functions of a position with of without reasonable accommodations is
a "qualified handicapped person."
101 The definition also includes individuals who can perform the essential functions
of the job without any accommodation.
102 Of course, the ADA, imposes no duty if the accommodation would result in an
undue hardship on the operation of the business (discussed infra Part III). Some state
laws which do not require reasonable accommodation require the individual.to be quali-
fied despite the handicap. See Frierson, supm note 30, at 638.
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these terms under the Rehabilitation Act shed light on how courts
will interpret the terms under the ADA. One fear that employers
have expressed regarding the ADA is that it will be difficult to
determine who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disabili-
ty and what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. There is no
doubt that employers will need to make these determinations, but
they are given some concessions to alleviate the possible burden
of this duty and the transaction costs associated with it. For in-
stance, under the ADA, as under the Rehabilitation Act, an'em-
ployer need only accommodate known disabilities.'" Thus, it is
generally up to individuals with disabilities to inform employers of
their disabilities and their need for accommodation.
0 4  Of
course knowledge of obvious impairments, such as use of a wheel-
chair,0 5 will be imputed to the employer1 °6
A. "Otherwise Qualified" and "Reasonable Accommodation"
Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act
Not surprisingly, the regulations and case law under the Re-
habilitation Act that address the issue of reasonable accommoda-
tion center around the terms "otherwise qualified," "essential
functions of the job," and "reasonable accommodation." Congress
has clearly stated that the reasonable accommodation provision in
section 12,112 (b)(5) of the ADA is to be applied as it was under
section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act.1 7 Thus, the decisions
under the Rehabilitation Act are a clear source of guidance for
decisions under the ADA. Furthermore, the ADA regulations,
using the Rehabilitation Act regulations and case law as guidance,
clarify these terms and provide further assistance in interpreting
them.
103 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
104 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,599 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.9) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991); Law and Explanation, supra note 31, at 24.
105 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,599 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.9) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
106 Still, the duty to accommodate generally arises at the request of the individual
with the disability. If no request is made, it is unlawful to provide an accommodation
which would be detrimental to the individual. Yet, discussion of the possibility of accom-
modation with the individual is appropriate. Law and Explanation, supra note 33, at 24.
107 Report from the Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sss., pt. 2, at 70 (1990).
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1. Qualified with or without accommodation
The ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act, provides that an em-
ployer may not discriminate against an "otherwise qualified indi-
vidual with a disability."' The ADA regulations outline two
steps for determining whether an individual is otherwise qualified.
First, determine if the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the
position, such as education, licenses, experience, or skill.'09 Sec-
ond, determine whether the individual can perform the essential
functions of the job with or without reasonable accommoda-
tions.11 °
Embodied in the term "otherwise qualified" is the presump-
tion that an individual must qualify for the job. This is the first
step of the ADA regulations' two step approach. If an individual
with a disability does not meet the legitimate prerequisites of the
job, for example a blind woman who applies for a position as a
CPA, but who is not a licensed CPA, then the ADA does not pro-
tect the individual."' To be eligible for a job, an individual
must meet the legitimate qualification standards of the job. 12
108 "Qualified individual with a disability" is defined at 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,111(8) as
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position. that such individual holds or
desires." Deference is given to the employer for determining what functions of the job
are essential, and any description written before a position is advertised will be consid-
ered as evidence.
The ADA regulations define "qualified individual with a disabiiity" as "an individual
with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience and education requirements"
of the position, "and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions" of the position. 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(m)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
Compare the definition in the EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1990),
which excludes individuals who would endanger the health and safety of themselves or
others. The regulations also specifically require that the individual meet the experience
and/or education requirements for the desired position, or meet the criteria for appoint-
ment under one of the special appointing authorities for handicapped persons.
109 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,594 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(m))
(proposed Feb. 28; 1991).
110 Id.
111 Similarly, the employer has the opportunity to show that the individual was fired
or passed over in hiring for legitimate reasons other than the disability. Reynolds v.
Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987) (epilepsy did not prevent employee from meet-
ing the physical requirements of the job). Educational requirements necessary to the job
are an example of legitimate reasons for disqualification. See supra note 108.
112 Qualification standards means "the personal and professional attributes including
the skill, experience, 'education, physical, medical, safety and other requirements estab-
lished by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to be
1991]
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Thus, the prima facie case for an individual with a disability
will include a showing that he or she: qualifies for the job, has a
disability and, therefore, belongs to a protected class; applied for
a job for which there was a vacancy, and was rejected. This raises
the presumption that the employer did not hire, or fired, the
individual because of the disability."n The employer then can
overcome the presumption by showing that the individual does
not meet the employer's qualification standards and that the em-
ployer .determined that the individual did not qualify based on a
nondiscriminatory evaluation of the individual's competency."14
The employer may also show, as a defense to disparate treatment
charges, legitimate alternative grounds for dismissal which are
nondiscriminatory."'
Yet, qualification criteria are not always obviously valid or
discriminatory. Some cases under the Rehabilitation Act have pro-
vided guidelines for determining whether a job requirement is
discriminatory. In Davis v. Meese," 6 the court established that re-
quirements for a specific position must be (1) directly connected
with and (2) substantially promote legitimate safety and job per-
formance concerns and (3) be tailored to those concerns." 7 In
that case, an insulin-dependant diabetic was held not otherwise
qualified to be a Special Agent of the FBI."' The decision rest-
ed primarily on the court's estimation of the potential risk of an
insulin-dependant diabetic having a severe hypoglycemic occur-
rence while on a dangerous duty assignment. The court tried to
determine an acceptable degree of risk by weighing the nature of
the job and the probability of an occurrence, but the results were
too uncertain.1" ° The court noted that "[n]o known method es-
eligible for the position held or desired." 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 16 3 0 .2(q)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
113 Rosiak v. United States Dept. of Army, 679 F. Supp 444, 449-50 (M.D. Pa. 1987),
ajf'd without op., 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988); Strathie v. Dept. of Trans., 716 F.2d 227
(3d Cir. 1983); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981).
114 See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556
F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (Rehabilitation Act not addressed on appeal).
115 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,590 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.15(a)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
116 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), affid, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989).
117 Id. at 517. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-22
(9th Cir. 1982) (diabetes).
118 Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (court considered the nature of
the job and determined that the danger and often out-of-the-way places agents operate in
outweighed the rarity of hypoglycemic occurrences).
119 Id. at 516.
[Vol. 66:1135
NOTE - DUTY TO ACCOMMODATE
tablishes within reasonable medical certainty, that the risk as to
any individual is nonexistent, minimal, or even very small, or any
basis to quantify such risk in any and all situations reasonably
likely to occur on the job."'20 The court also noted that the
worst case scenario could be devastating to the government, co-
workers, the public, and the diabetic agent."' Based on this
fact, the court rejected a case-by-case determination for the posi-
tion and allowed a blanket exclusion based on the relevant, legiti-
mate, physical requirement.122 Thus, one could say that a legiti-
mate prerequisite qualification, or preliminary disqualifying crite-
ria, for the position of Special Agent is not to have diabetes.
Since diabetics are a safety risk in this particular position, the
requirement is legitimate under the court's reasoning.
Consistent withi Davis, the ADA regulations include safety
standards as an example of legitimate qualification standards. 23
The regulations provide that an employer "may require, as a qual-
ification standard, that an individual not pose a direct threat to
120 Id. at 517. See Salmon Pineiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483 (D.C. Puerto Rico
1987) (Navy criminal investigator with epilepsy found not qualified by reasoning similar
to Davis). Cf. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (court looked to the
individual diabetic and his work history).
121 692 F. Supp. at 516.
122 Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. at 517. See Southeastern Comm. College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 407 (1979) (the Supreme Court emphasized that "legitimate physical quali-
fications may be essential to participation in particular programs."). In this case, the
Supreme Court noted that the term "otherwise qualified," with respect to legitimate
physical qualifications, would mean qualified "in spite of" the handicap. In support of
their position the Court cites the Department of HEW:
The Department believes that the omission of the word 'otherwise' is necessary
in order to comport with the intent of the statute because, read literally,
'otherwise' qualified handicapped persons include persons who are qualified
except for their handicap, rather than in spite of their handicap. Under such a
literal reading, a blind person possessing all of the qualifications for driving a
bus except sight could be said to be 'otherwise qualified' for the job of driving.
Clearly, such a result was not intended by Congress. In all other respects, the
terms 'qualified' and 'otherwise qualified' are intended to be interchangeable.
Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A, at 405 (1990)).
The ADA specifically states that an individual's qualification is to be determined
despite the disability. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. However, the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the narrow class of cases involving legitimate physical
requirements is not inconsistent with the spirit of the ADA. If a physical requirement is
necessary to the job, and no accommodation will enable the disabled individual to meet
the requirement, then the individual will not be qualified nor "otherwise qualified."
123 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(q)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
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the health or safety of himself/herself or others." 124 As with any
other qualification, the safety requirement must apply equally to
all employees and job applicants. Furthermore, an employer must
consider whether any reasonable accommodation would reduce
the threat posed by the individual to an acceptable level.125
Unlike the ADA regulations, the regulation defining "qualified
handicapped person" under the Rehabilitation Act does not men-
tion risk considerations. 126 However, "courts which have applied
section [794] unanimously have held that a handicapped individu-
al cannot perform the essential functions of a job if his handicap
poses a significant safety risk to those around him."' 27 The
courts have used a variety of tests including the "reasonable prob-
ability of substantial harm" test and the "elevated risk" test to
determine whether an individual qualifies for a position when he
or she poses a safety risk.
In Jansen v. Food Circus Supermarke Inc.,128 the supermarket
fired an epileptic butcher after determining that he posed a safety
threat to himself and his co-workers. The supermarket arrived at
this conclusion because medical experts could not "guarantee"
that epileptics would not harm themselves or others while cutting
meat. 129 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that the employer had violated the state disability law'"0 since it
had the burden of proving that the epilepsy presented a "materi-
ally enhanced risk of serious injury" to the individual with the
disability or other employees.' 3 ' The supermarket had not met
that burden because the medical experts who testified for the
supermarket did not make an "individualized assessment" of
124 Id. (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(r)).
125 Id.
126 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1990).
127 Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1991) (professional engineer
with Parkinson's disease not qualified to be a construction inspector).
128 110 N.J. 363, 541 A.2d 682 (1988).
129 Id. Jansen, the meat cutter, only had a mild form of the disease and had only
had one mild seizure at work.
130 The court was interpreting New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-2.1, 10:5-4.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). Specifically, the court considered
the part of the law which states that an employer may terminate "the employment of
any person who in the opinion of the employer, reasonably arrived at, is unable to per-
form adequately the duties of employment." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-2.1.
131 110 N.J. at 376, 541 A.2d at 689. The medical expert's report was deficient, in
part, because it failed to distinguish between the probability of future seizures and the
risk of harm resulting from seizures. 110 N.J. at 377, 541 A.2d at 690. See Frierson,
supra note 30, at 639.
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Jansen's disability and the risk of harm he posed, but they drew
conclusions about epileptics generally.1 32
A similar case involving epilepsy under the Rehabilitation Act
also followed the "reasonable probability of substantial harm"
test.1 33 In that case, an epileptic applied for a position with the
Postal Service that involved use of a letter sorting machine. The
Postal Service declined to hire the individual on the basis of a
medical exam which disclosed the condition and the doctor's
recommendation that the individual not be allowed to use ma-
chines with moving parts. The district court applied the "elevated
risk" test (the medical condition created an elevated risk of future
injury), and determined that the individual was not otherwise
qualified.1 4
The court of appeals reversed the district court, applying the
"reasonable probability of substantial harm" test, requiring the
employer to gather substantial information regarding the work
and medical history of the applicant. 5 In this case, that history
showed that the applicant had worked with machinery significantly
in the past without incident or complaint. The history further
showed that the applicant had - had no daytime seizures in the
past few years, and that the few seizures which occurred at work
caused no injury to anyone. Thus, the court found the applicant
qualified because no probability of substantial harm existed. 36
132 110 N.J. at 377, 541 A.2d at 690. The ADA regulations require an individual
assessment, which meauis an "individual assessment of both the particular job at issue,
and of .the specific physical or mental limitations of the particular individual in need of
reasonable accommodations." 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,599 (1991) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. app. 1630.9) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991) (emphasis added). But cf. Chicago &
N.W.R.R. v. Labor & Industry Review Comm., 91 Wis.2d 462, 283 N.W.2d 603, afid, 98
Wis.2d 592, 297 N.W.2d 819 (1980) (medical testimony regarding epileptics generally
allowed to support conclusion that no reasonable probability of future seizures existed
for the railroad welder).
133 Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985). Accord, Kelley v. Bechtel Pow-
er Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 43 Colo.
App. 446, 614 P.2d 891 (1979); Higgins v. Maine Central R.R. Co., 471 A.2d 288 (Me.
1984); Lewis v. Remmele Eng'g, Inc., 314 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1981); Rose v. Hanna Mining
Co., 94 Wash.2d 307, 616 P.2d 1229 (1980); Chicago & N.W.R1R. v. Labor & Indus. Re-
view Comm., 98 Wis.2d 592, 297 N.W.2d 819 (1980) (welder's epileptic seizure disorder
did not present a reasonable probability of hazard on date of his disqualification). See
Frierson, supra note 30, at 640.
134 767 F.2d 1416.
135 See also Mikucki v. United States Postal Serv., 41 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) [
36,635 (D.C.S.D. Mass.), dismissed, on reconsid., 42 F.E.P. Cas. (BNA) 338 (D.C. Mass.
1986) (court cannot determine if a reasonable probability -of substantial harm exists with-
out examining the work- and medical records of the applicant).
136 Id. Cf. Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1990) (testimony of three
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When determining whether a safety risk renders an individual
not otherwise qualified, the court must evaluate findings of fact
based on reasonable medical judgements about the nature, dura-
tion, and severity of risk and probabilities that the disability will
cause harm. For instance, in Arline v. School Board of Nassau Coun-
ty,137 the court determined that a school teacher with a history
of tuberculosis was otherwise qualified to teach school children
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act." 8  The court
found that she posed no threat of communicating the disease to
the children, she was on medication, her family had not tested
positive for the disease, exposure to the children was for a limit-
ed time, and experts testified that she had been cured. The court
noted that the School Board did not base its decision to fire the
teacher on reasonable medical advice, but rather on "society's
accumulated myths and fears about [tuberculosis]."" 9 Neither
the threat of injury to others nor the risk to the handicapped
individual can be "based on unfounded fears or stereotypes."140
Thus, courts generally consider individuals with disabilities and
their special circumstances in light of the specific job sought.
Based on that thoughtful consideration, if the individual legiti-
mately poses a safety risk, the court will determine that the indi-
vidual is not qualified for the job. In many other cases, the courts
have similarly determined that when such a risk is present, the
individual is not otherwise qualified for the position.14 1
physicians as to Chiari's specific condition supported finding that he was unqualified
because he posed a safety risk); Samens v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm., 117 Wis.2d
646, 345 N.W.2d 432 (1984) (due to hazardous nature of job and unpredictability of
epileptic seizures and ease of triggering seizure, electric company's refusal to hire epilep-
tic as groundman was rationally related to obligation to public safety). See generally
Frierson, supra note 30, at 639.
137 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla. 1988). Cf. Foss v. Chicago, 817 F.2d 34 (7th Cir.
1987).
138 This case has a long history, and the Supreme Court of the United States ad-
dressed it several times. For the Supreme Court's discussion of the definition of "handi-
capped individual" under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act see School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
139 Id. at 284. Note that this is a relevant holding for other communicable diseases
including AIDS.
140 Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1990).
141 See, e.g., Chiari, 920 F.2d 311 (a significant risk of personal injury can disqualify a
person from a job if the employer cannot eliminate the risk). See Frierson, supra note
30, at 638.
Similarly, under California law individuals are not protected "where the employee,
because of his or her physical handicap, is unable to perform his or her duties, or can-
not perform such duties in a manner which would not endanger his or her health or
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The ADA regulations adopt the "significant risk of substantial
harm" criteria.' A speculative, slightly increased, or remote risk
is insufficient grounds for firing or denying employment to an
,individual with a disability. 4 3 The regulations confirm that em-
ployers and courts should base a determination that an individual
with a disability poses a "direct threat" on "a reasonable medical
judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge
and/or the best available objective evidence. " 144 Employers must
identify the specific risk posed, as well as the behavior or aspect
of the disability which creates the risk.' When making the de-
termination, courts and employers should consider:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; and
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur.4"
Furthermore, the ADA regulations, -consistent with Arline, warn
against using generalized fears and stereotypic assumptions to
determine that an individual with a disability is a "direct
threat."1
47
In addition to s2fety qualifications, courts interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act have held other physical qualifications valid.
Individuals with disabilities who were denied employment because
safety or the health or safety of others." ANN. CAL. GOV. CODE § 12940(a)(1) (West
1980 & Supp. 1991). Under that law, the employer is required to show more than a
mere possibility of future injury. Sterling Transit v. Fair Employment Practice Comm., 28
Emp. Prac. Dec. § 32,543 (1981) (truck driver with prior back injury not disqualified
because evidence did not conclusively show a risk of future injury). See also Dauten v.
Muskegon County, 128 Mich. App. 435, 340 N.W.2d 117 (1983) (lifeguard with back
spasms not protected by Michigan law because frequent confrontation with life-saving
situations may endanger lives of guard and victim); Samens v. Labor & Indus. Review
Comm., 117 Wis.2d 646, 345 N.W.2d 432 (1984) (safety-based nature of electric
company's hiring standards were valid grounds for excluding epileptic from position of
groundman); Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm., 98 Wis.2d 592, 297
N.W.2d 819 (1980) (substantial evidence supported finding that epileptic welder did not
present a reasonable probability of harm on date of disqualification from railroad);
Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. State, 90 Wis.2d 408, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979) (Supreme Court of
Wisconsin stated that ability to efficiently perform duties includes ability to perform
without a materially enhanced risk of death, or serious injury to employee or others in
future).
142 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(r)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
143 Id. at 8,596 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(r)).
144 Id.
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they were not otherwise qualified include a policeman who be-
came a paraplegic,148 and a park technician with a heart condi-
don that prevented him from walking over rough ground, han-
dling disorderly park visitors, or safely operating a motor boat
alone. 149 In the first case, Simon v. St. Louis County, the court
also confirmed that an employer may require a person to meet
legitimate physical qualifications which are essential to the job. In
this case, an active commissioned police officer needed to be able
to make a forcible arrest and transfer prisoners. The court used
the following test: (1) are the requirements reasonable, legitimate,
and necessary,15 (2) are they uniformly required, (3) did the
employer consider the impairment, experience, and function the
individual could perform, and (4) are the accommodations neces-
sary for the individual unreasonable.' 5 ' The appellate court hint-
ed that physical requirements may not have been essential to all
positions on the force. However, it noted that the officer did not
apply for any other position and that the trial court ruling was
not clearly erroneous. Because the paralyzed officer did not meet
the legitimate physical prerequisite for the position, he was not
qualified for the position. 152
Thus, employers need not fear the burden of having to hire
unqualified individuals solely because they have disabilities. The
ADA only requires covered employers to hire qualified individuals
with disabilities based on nondiscriminatory job qualifications. For
example, in one Rehabilitation Act case, the court found that an
employer had discriminated against a dyslexic job applicant by
148 Simon v. St. Louis County, 735 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1984).
149 Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (lth Cir. 1983) (once it is established that
the individual was denied the job because of the disability, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to show that the criteria used are job related and that the plaintiff could not per-
form the essential functions of the job safely and efficiently. Furthermore, the accommo-
dation necessary for the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the job would
have been burdensome to the park since it would have required doubling up of limited
park workers.).
150 The employer bears the burden of proof on this point. Simon, 735 F.2d at 1084.
151 Id. at 1083.
152 The Rehabilitation Act case law in this area overlaps questions of preliminary
qualifications and essential functions of the job. The first step of the ADA analysis, pre-
liminary qualifications, is sometimes referred to in the Rehabilitation Act case law as
determining whether an individual is "otherwise qualified." 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,594
(1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(m)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). The same
terms are sometimes used when determining whether an individual is able to perform
the essential functions of the job. Since the ADA regulations separate the issues into a
two step analysis, this Note follows that pattern, but uses case law which may be appro-
priate to both issues.
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failing to provide him with an oral exam to determine his qualifi-
cations as a heavy equipment operator.'53 In that case, the job
applicant applied for a job which had nothing to do with reading
and writing. Nevertheless, the employer required a written exam
to determine job qualifications. Because the applicant was dyslex-
ic, he could not pass the written exam. The written exam masked
the individual's qualification for the job, thus the refusal to pro-
vide an oral exam was discriminatory. Therefore, when eliminat-
ing an individual with a disability from a position, employers
should be sure that the decision to do so rests upon valid, non-
discriminatory reasons.
2. The Essential Functions of the Job
The second step outlined in the ADA regulations is to deter-
mine whether the individual can perform the essential functions
of the job with or without reasonable accommodations. 154 Both
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act define "qualified individual
with a disability" as one who "can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or de-
sires." '55  For instance, while the Rehabilitation Act required
the Postal Service to -reasonably accommodate a worker with ar-
thritis, the court found that the Postal Service had not discrim-
inated against him by firing him for poor attendance. The worker
153 Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (lth Cir. 1983).
154 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,594 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(m))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
155 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,111(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f)
(1990) (regulations defining qualified individual with a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act).
State laws also require that the individual be capable of performing the duties of
the job. See eg., Ashworth v. Jefferson Screw Prod., Inc., 176 Mich. App. 737, 440
N.W.2d 101, appeal denied, 433 Mich. 837, 447 N.W.2d 690 (1989) (grinder operator with
leg in cast could not return to work when recalled from layoff due to need of therapy
and conceded that he would be unable to perform duties in present condition-handicap
directly related to job performance, therefore not protected); Bowerman v. Malloy Litho-
graphing, Inc., 171 Mich. App. 110, 430 N.W.2d 742 (1988) (employee incapable of per-
forming job duties not "handicapped" under Michigan Handicappers' Act); Allen v.
Southeastern Mich. Transp. Auth. (SEMTA), 132 Mich. App. 533, 349 N.W.2d 204 (1984)
(refusal to employ is justified if disability is related to ability to perform the duties of
the job); Beauregard v. Clarke-Gravely Corp., 131 Mich. App. 559, 346 N.W.2d 48 (1982)
(plaintiff must be physically and mentally able to perform the job efficiently to satisfy
the Act, and there must be a job available that plaintiff could perform); Bucyrus-Erie Co.
v. State, 90 Wis.2d 408, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979) (Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated
that an employer is not required to retain or hire an employee who is physically or
otherwise unable to efficiently perform the job up to standards set by the employer.).
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was not qualified for the job due to his poor attendance.'56 One
who does not show up for work cannot perform any job func-
tions, essential or otherwise.' 57
Thus, the second step in ADA analysis of "otherwise qualified
individual" should focus on the essential functions of the job and
reasonable accommodations. Generally, the essential functions of a
job are the "primary job duties that are intrinsic to the employ-
ment position."158 They do not include "the marginal or periph-
eral functions of the position that are incidental to the perfor-
mance of the primary job functions." 159
The appendix to the ADA regulations presents two issues for
consideration when determining whether a job function is essen-
tial. First, one must consider whether the employer actually re-
quires employees in that position to perform the function in ques-
tion. 60 For instance, an employer may not require a drivers li-
cense for a job which does not require driving and then refuse to
hire a person who cannot drive because of a disability.' 6 ' Sec-
ond, if employees are required to perform the function, courts
and employers should determine whether eliminating the function
would fundamentally alter the position. 62 Congress stated that
the ADA will not entitle employers to rely on tasks in the job
description which are incidental to the actual job and which the
individual with a disability cannot perform. 16
The regulations list several reasons for which courts and em-
ployers may consider a job function "essential:"
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the posi-
tion exists is to perform that function;
156 King v. United States Postal Serv., 47 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 38,181 (D.D.C.
1988).
157 Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affid without op.,
831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1987) (postal worker fired for absenteeism failed to make prima
facie case that he was qualified employee with a disability and could not establish dispa-
rate impact case since he did not comply with Executive Order 5396 requiring that he
give prior notice of absenteeism caused by disability in order for the absence not to
count against him).
158 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(n)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 8,575 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(n)) (proposed Feb. 28,
1991).
161 136 CONG. REc. H2623 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Mr. Fish).
162 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,8595 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(n))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
163 136 CONG. REc. H2623 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Mr. Fish).
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(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited num-
ber of employees available among whom the performance of
that job function can be distributed; and/or
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incum-
bent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability
to perform the particular function.' 64
The first and third reasons are nearly self-evident. Obviously, if an
employer hires an individual to repair bicycles, then the individual
must be able to repair bicycles since that is the reason the job
exists. Repairing bicycles is the essential function of the job. Simi-
larly, if an employer hires an individual to cut diamonds because
of that individual's expertise in the field, then the individual must
be able to cut diamonds. Cutting diamonds is the essential func-
tion of the job.'
The second reason one may consider. a function of a job
essential, limited number of employees available to do the job, is
equally understandable. Treadwell v, Alexander provides an example
of the second reason.' 65 In that case, a park technician with a
heart condition was unable to perform all the functions of the job
safely, such as walking over rough terrain or handling disorderly
park visitors. If the park retained -the technician, other park em-
ployees would have had to have taken over some of his duties.
Since the park only had a limited number of employees, this
would have required some of them to double their duties, thus
reducing the efficiency of their- jobs and the safety of the
park.1
66
>Xlr V.TiS~ 167Dexler v. Tisch presents another example of how a job
function might be essential due to a limited number of employ-
ees. In this case, the problem does not rest in a low number of
available employees, but in the fast-paced and heavy workload
characteristic of a large central Post Office.168 The nature of the
job made it necessary for Mr. Dexler to be able to perform all
the functions of the job efficiently, especially when the flow of
mail through the facility was particularly heavy. Each person had
164 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(n)(2))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991). This list is not a limitation on the possible reasons a job func-
tion may be essential. Id.
165 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983). See supa note 149 and accompanying text.
166 Id. See the discussion of this case infra note 314 and accompanying text.
167 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987). See infra notes 301-11 and accompanying
text.
168 Id. at 1428.
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to be able to work a full load at all times.1 69 If one person
slowed down or slacked off, either the work would not get done,
or the other employees would be burdened with extra work.1 7
0
Thus, all the job functions were essential because no other person
could reasonably be expected to perform them.
Just as many reasons exist to consider a function essential to
a job, there are also many factors which may provide evidence
that a function is essential. When determining whether a function
is essential to a position, courts may consider the following:
(i) The employer's judgement as to which functions are essen-
tial;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared for advertising or inter-
viewing job applicants for the job.17 1
The second factor, the written job description, can be crucial to a
court's determination of the essential functions of a job. Under
the Rehabilitation Act, the court in Guinn v. Bolgeri' 2 deter-
mined that an employee is entitled to rely upon the standard job
description that the employer provided. The central issue was the
scope of "essential functions" under the Rehabilitation Act. 7 3 In
Guinn, a postal worker working as a multi-position letter sorting
machine operator had permanent osteoarthritis (swelling pain and
stiffness of knee joints), and had to avoid long periods of stand-
ing. Although at the time of her dismissal she was able to per-
form all of the functions in the standard position description set
out by the Postal Service, her employer claimed that the descrip-
tion was incomplete as to the true nature of the position. The
employer claimed that she was unqualified because she was un-
able to perform other functions of the job not listed which re-
quired long periods of standing.7 4 The court held that the es-
sential functions of the job were those for which the employee
was hired, those in the SPD, and that the employee was entitled
to rely on that job description. 7 5
169 Id.
170 See the discussion of this case infra note 307 and accompanying text.
171 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(n)(3))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
172 598 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1984).
173 Id. at 201.
174 Id.
175 Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the fact that the employee previously per-
formed the duties not included in the job description did not justify the Postal Service
dismissing her when she became unable to perform those duties which were outside the
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The ADA appears to incorporate Guinn because section
101(8) states specifically:
consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to
what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interview-
ing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered
evidence of the essential functions of the job.176
But, as this section states, and as the ADA regulations reaffirm,
the job description in only evidence of the essential functions of
the position. 7 The employer's judgment about the essential
functions, the first enumerated factor, should also be con-
sidered." 8 In Guinn, the court had to consider not only the
written description, but also the employer's verbal opinion. The
court gave greater weight to the written description provided by
the employer, which the employee relied on, than to the
employer's after the fact statements.
The goal in examining these factors is to insure that individu-
als with disabilities are not eliminated from positions when they
are able to perform the essential functions of a job, but unable to
perform tasks incidental or peripheral to the job. As the court
stated in Bentivegna v. United States Department of Labor,7 ' "if a
job qualification is to be permitted to exclude handicapped indi-
viduals, it must be directly connected with, and must substantially
promote, 'business necessity and safe performance.'"'8 g The
ADA reflects this decision stating that the "standard, test or other
selection criteria, . . . [must] be job-related" and "consistent with
business necessity."' 8 '
scope of the job description. Id. at 201-02.
176 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,111(8) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
177 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. p. 16 3 0.2(n)(3))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
178 Id. See supra note 171.
179 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982).
180 Id. at 622 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 32.14 (b)). See, e.g., Wallace v. Veterans Admin.,
683 F. Supp. 758 (D. Kan. 1988) (hospital's only evidence was conjecture about risks and
morale, despite the fact that the plaintiff established her prima facie case). In Wallace
the court found that the hospital's refusal to accommodate a recovering nurse who was
formerly addicted to drugs was based on "conclusory statements that are being used to
justify reflexive reactions grounded in ignorance and capitulation of public prejudice." Id.
at 767 (quoting School B&L of Nassau County v. Arline, 772 F.2d 759, 765 (lth Cir.
1985)).
181 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,112(b)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991). See 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578
(1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.15(b) and (c)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
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Furthermore, the job requirement should focus on the result
and not the means of accomplishing it.'8 2 Congress referred to
a case under the Rehabilitation Act to exemplify the intent in this
regard.' In that case, the Postal Service job description re-
quired that an employee be able to use both arms to perform the
task of lifting and carrying mail. Due to a disability which limited
the mobility of the left arm, the employee was unable to use both
arms, but was able to do the job. The court found that the em-
ployee was able to perform the essential functions of the job de-
spite the job description. 8 4
Thus, it appears that while a job description will constitute
the essential functions of a position, it may not be valid if it in-
cludes incidental or unrelated functions-a determination appar-
ently left to the courts. The written description is not considered
binding. The employee can challenged the description by present-
ing evidence attempting to show, for instance, that it includes
incidental functions. But it also preyents courts from arbitrarily
substituting their judgment for the employer's as to the essential
functions because the description will reflect the employer's judg-
ment and will act as a starting point for a court's evaluation.'
The weight of the written description depends on "how closely
tailored it is to the essential duties of the actual job."186 Thus,
an employer should be careful when drafting such a job descrip-
tion to include all functions thought essential by the employer,
but should also be careful not to include unnecessary and irrele-
vant skills. "Writing down discriminatory criteria certainly does
not shield [employers]," and the description so written may be
182 Id.
183 Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
184 Id.
185 136 CONG. REc. H2469 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Mr. McCollum,
who introduced the amendment). The appendix to the ADA regulations states that "the
inquiry into essential functions is not intended to second guess an employer's business
judgment with regard to production standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, nor to
require employers to lower such standards." 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,595 (1991) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(n)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). For example, an employ-
er can require a typist to type 75 words per minute and not have to explain why the
requirement is not lower, as long as the employer in fact imposes that requirement on
its employees. Id. But, if the employer allegedly imposes the higher standard for the
purpose of excluding individuals with disabilities, the employer may have to show nondis-
criminatory reasons for imposing that standard. Id.
186 136 CONG. REc. H2469 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Mr. Edwards of
California).
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used as evidence against them."8 7
Thus, the courts need to consider factors other than the
employer's opinion or the written job description to make an
informed decision as to the essential functions of any particular
job. Other factors may include:
(iii) The amount of time'spent on the job performing the func-
tion;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to per-
form the function;
(v) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vi) The current work experience of incumbents in similar
jobs.18
The third factor, the amount of'time' spent performing the func-
tion, is considered in a Rehabilitation Act case, Hall v. United
States 'Postal Service.189 In that case, the court indicated that
heavy lifting would be an essential function of a postal clerk's job
if it were done "repetitively every day." 9 ' Hall also considers
the fifth factor, the work experience of past incumbents in the
job.' Hall stated that when she worked as a clerk in the early
1970's, she never observed other clerks doing any heavy lifting,
nor did she do any herself. The court indicated that this was a
material fact, noting that "if lifting were 'essential' to the position,
she most likely would have had to do some lifting herself, or at
least would have observed others doing heavy lifting." 19 2 The
court remanded for findings of fact on these issues. 93
Because job descriptions may change over time, it is also
relevant for courts to consider the sixth factor, the work experi-
ence of current incumbents in the job. For instance, in Hall, the
court may have found that heavy lifting was essential to the posi-
tion if the Postal Service were able to show that they required
distribution clerks today to do heavy lifting and that the clerks
187 Id.
188 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (199i) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(n)(3))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
189 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir., 1988).. See 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. app. 1630) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 596, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1990).
190 857 F.2d at 1079. The case was remanded for further findings of fact.
191 857 F.2d at 1079.
192 Id. The heavy lifting requirement in the case was lifting seventy pounds, and Hall
could only lift twenty-five to thirty. Id.
193 Id. at 1080.
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acutally do such work.
The final factor to consider is the fourth mentioned in the
ADA regulations-the consequence of not requiring the employee
to perform the function. As an example, the ADA regulations
mention a fire fighter who is unable to carry heavy people. While
a fire fighter may not have to do so often, the consequence of
not requiring that individual to carry a heavy person out of a
burning building could be tragic. Thus, it is an essential function
of the fire fighter's job. This shows the highly fact specific nature
of any inquiry into the essential functions of a job. While the
amount of time spent on a function may be a significant factor in
one case, like Hall, it could be outweighed significantly by other
factors in another case, such as the fire fighter case.
The factors in this list are not dispositive, but are evidence
for courts and employers to consider. Furthermore, any determi-
nation of the issue is not limited to this list of considerations. 94
Essentially, courts will have to determine the issue on a case-by-
case basis, considering all relevant evidence.1 95 Courts should
not give greater weight to the enumerated factors, but should
consider all factors in light of the circumstances of the individual
case.
196
The case law generated under the Rehabilitation Act and
state disability laws clearly demonstrates that courts have been
intent on judicious enforcement of disability laws. The ADA is
"not intended to limit the ability of covered entities to choose
and maintain a qualified workforce." 197 As long as an employer's
qualification standards for a position are legitimate in light of the
job in question, an applicant or employee with a disability must
be able to efficiently meet that standard. An employer does not
have to hire an unqualified person. If the individual with a dis-
ability shows that he or she is an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability, that individual has met the threshold require-
ment of the ADA. The employer then must comply with the ADA
by accommodating the individual or by showing that no reason-
able accommodation would have been appropriate under the cir-




197 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,597 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.4) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
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B. Reasonable Accommodations
The court stated in Hall v. United States Postal Semice:198
It is evident from a review of the case law in this area that the
"otherwise' qualified" inquiry requires a consideration not only
of the handicapped applicant's ability to perform the job's
essential function, but also whether a reasonable accommoda-
tion by the employer would enable the handicapped person to
perform those functions.
1 9
Thus, in determining whether an individual is qualified for the
job, the employer will have to consider the possible reasonable
accommodations that would elnable the individual to perform the
essential functions. 00 This naturally leads to the inquiry into
what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
The Act specifies that reasonable accommodations may in-
clude:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessi-
ble to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifica-
tions of examinations, training materials or policies, the provi-
sion of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities.201
This broad, generic definition will inevitably require further clarifi-
cation by the courts. Since it is not meant to be a limitation on
the range of acceptable accommodations, the potential for judicial
challenge is increased. This requires the persons in charge of per-
sonnel in businesses to be cautious and prudent in hiring deci-
sions which involve individuals with disabilities. They will need to
198 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988).
199 Id. at 1078. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (the
court must consider whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would en-
able the person to perform the essential functions of the job).
200 E.g., Shelby Township Fire Dep't v. Shields, 115 Mich. App. 98, 320 N.W.2d 306
(1982) (superseded by statute as stated in Carr v. Gen'l Motors Corp., 135 Mich. App.
226, 353 N.W.2d 489 (1984), rev'd, 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986)) (fire fighter's
discharge was improper under Michigan law when he was not given the chance to estab-
lish that accommodations were available which would allow hin to perform his duties
with a beard).
201 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12,111(9) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991). See 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578,
8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(o)(2)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
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research and become familiar with disability law, both developed
and new, to make decisions which will not subject them to litiga-
tion. Although the plaintiff must initially come forward with evi-
dence, the employer will bear the ultimate burden of showing
that no reasonable accommodation could have qualified the indi-
vidual to perform the essential functions of the job."2 This de-
termination will in some cases require significant transaction costs
and time because of the employer's need to learn about the dis-
ability, the possible accommodations, available outside financial re-
sources, and also the relevant law. But, it has been noted that
difficult and complex determinations will be the exception.203
Furthermore, it is likely that the individual with a disability will
have most of the information necessary to determine the options
for accommodation, thereby cutting down on transaction costs
and making the determination easier for the employer.20 4
Recognizing that appropriate accommodations will not always
be obvious to the employer or even to an employee with a dis-
ability, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
suggested an informal four-step approach to the situation, which
is also discussed in the appendix to the ADA regulations. 20 5 The
first step is to identify barriers to equal opportunity. This includes
an assessment of the essential and non-essential tasks of the posi-
tion sought, the work environment, and the abilities and limita-
tions of the individual with a disability. The employer should then
determine how these factors interact and what barriers that inter-
action creates.0 6 Second, the employer and the individual with
a disability should identify possible accommodations. The employ-
er can enhance this process by consulting appropriate State Voca-
202 Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 478 (11th Cir. 1983); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704
(1990). See Carter v. Bennett, 651 F. Supp. 1299 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 840 F.2d 63, 65-66
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (the plaintiff must show in the prima facie case that reasonable accom-
modation is possible, then the burden shifts to the employer to present credible evi-
dence which shows an inability to accommodate, then the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff for rebuttal).
203 See supra note 5.
204 Report from the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, S. REP. No. 116,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 34-35 (1989). The ADA becomes effective two years after enact-
ment, so employers will also have that time to become familiar with the act and to con-
sider the impact it will bear on business. Also, before the summer of 1991, the pro-
posed EEOC regulations for the ADA should be implemented in final form.
205 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 34-35 (1989); 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,599-
600 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. App. 1630.9) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). See also
Id. at 8,588 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(o)(3)).
206 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 34-35 (1989).
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tional Rehabilitation Service agencies, the Job Accommodation
Network operated by the President's Committee on Employment
of People with Disabilities, as well as other employers and organi-
zations. 20
7
Once possible accommodations have been suggested, the
third step is to assess the reasonableness of the proposal in terms
of effectiveness and equal opportunity, considering such factors as
reliability,' timing, and availability."' Finally, the employer
should implement the accommodation if it does not impose an
undue hardship on the employer and if it is appropriate for the
individual with a disability and the job in question.0 9
While this four-step approach will help employers organize
their evaluations of individuals with disabilities, they still will need
to interpret the ADA's terms throughout the evaluation process,
especially "reasonable accommodation."
The ADA regulations expand the analysis of this definition
providing better guidance for its interpretation. Furthermore, this
term is not without precedent. The Rehabilitation Act and several
state statutes have used the term "reasonable accommodation"
providing both federal and state courts an opportunity to inter-
pret its meaning.210 In addition to the regulations, adjudications
under the ADA will have the Rehabilitation Act decisions, as well
as the numerous articles written on the topic, as a base upon
which to formulate a more exacting definition of the reasonable
accommodation standard.211 Employment personnel troubled by
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id. If more than one option is available, the employer may choose the easiest
and least expensive accommodation so long as it meets the needs of the employee. Id.
210 For examples of state statutes requiring reasonable accommodations see CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12,994 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991) (not required to provide accommoda-
tion which would be an undue hardship); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 722(6), 732, 725
(1) (1985 & Supp. 1990) (defining reasonable accommodation and exceptions, outlining
the duties of the employer to provide requested accommodations, and naming affirma-
tive defenses); Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Law, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.1102(102)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990) ("A person shall accommodate a handicapper
for purposes of employment"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(J) (1987 & Supp. 1989) (dis-
criminatory for employer to "refuse or fail to accommodate" an individual's disability);
Wis. STAT. § 111.34(1)(b) (1988 & Supp. 1990) (it is discriminatory to refuse "to reason-
ably accommodate an employee's or prospective employee's handicap").
211 Congress has repeatedly stated that Title I of the ADA is modeled after the Re-
habilitation Act and is to be interpreted in a similar manner. See, eg., Report from Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 70
(1990).
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the definition can also look to the previous interpretations of the
term and the proposed ADA regulations for guidance in their
decision-making.
1. The EEOC Regulations Implementing the ADA
According to the ADA regulations, "reasonable accommoda-
tion" means:
(i) Any modification or adjustment to a job application process
that enables a qualified individual with a disability to be con-
sidered for the position such qualified individual desires, and
which will not impose an undue hardship on the .. .business;
or
(ii) Any modification or adjustment to the work environment,
or to the manner or circumstances under which the posi-
tion... is customarily performed, that enables a qualified
individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of
that position ... ; or
(iii) Any modification or adjustment that enables a covered
entity's employee with a disability to enjoy the same benefits
and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by other similarly
situated employees without disabilities, and which will not im-
pose an undue hardship on the operation of the ... busi-
ness.
2 12
Specific types of accommodations are included in the ADA and
are also listed in the regulations as mentioned above. 21" This list
is by no means exhaustive.2 14 The ADA may require many other
possible accommodations depending on specific situations.
Yet, the obligation to provide an individual with disabilities a
reasonable accommodation only applies to modifications or ac-
commodations which are job-related. 215 A job-related accommo-
dation is one which "specifically assists the individual in perform-
ing the duties of a particular job."216 The job-related accommo-
dation applies to all services or programs provided by the employ-
er and to all non-work facilities such as break rooms, ciafeterias or
212 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(o)(1))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
213 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
214 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,595 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
215 Id. at 8,598 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.9) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
216 Id.
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health clubs.21 While these areas are not a part of the job per
se, they are related to an individual's employment and are, there-
fore, job-related for ADA purposes. However, an employer is not
required to provide an accommodation of a strictly personal na-
ture, or one which is helpful on and off the job."1  The appen"
dix to the ADA regulations lists as examples, a prosthetic limb,
wheelchair, or eyeglasses.219 All are devices which help individu-
als with disabilities throughout his or her daily activities, and they
are, therefore, not strictly job-related.22 °
Nonetheless, neither the ADA nor the regulations prohibit
employers from providing accommodations beyond those required
by the Act.221 Additional accommodations mentioned in the ap-
pendix to the regulations include permitting an employee to ac-
crue paid leave or providing the employee with additional unpaid
leave for necessary treatment.222 Furthermore, an employer may
make employer provided transportation accessible, provide person-
al assistants (i.e. page turner or travel attendant), and reserve
parking spaces.223 Whether these accommodations are required
or not depends on the specific factual circumstances of each case.
It is, therefore, helpful to consider the Rehabilitation Act case law
in conjunction with the ADA regulations to gain greater insight
into the significance of the duty to provide reasonable accommo-
dations to individuals with disabilities.
2. Risk to health and safety considered
One of the most obvious criteria for reasonableness is safety.
While the court must determine on one hand whether reasonable
accommodations will qualify an individual with a disability for a
given position, the court must also consider whether the accom-
modation will pose a safety risk to the individual or to others at
the job site.224 In other words, employers must consider wheth-
er placing the individual in the position and accommodating the
217 Id. at 8,599.
218 Id. at 8,598.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 8,599.
222 Id. at 8,595 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o)).
223 Id.
224 This is distinguished from the individual himself or herself posing a safety risk,
which would disqualify the individual from the job, as discussed supra notes 118-47 and
accompanying text.
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person for the position will expose the individual or others to a
risk of future injury. If an accommodation poses such a threat,
courts have generally found that the accommodation is not rea-
sonable even though it would qualify an individual with a disabili-
ty for a job.
For example, in Dexler v. Tisch,225  an individual with
achondroplastic dwarfism 226 argued that the accommodation of
a $300 step stool enabled him to reach a height necessary to sort
mail for the United States Postal Service. With this accommoda-
tion he would be "otherwise qualified" for the position. Neverthe-
less, the court determined that the stool was not a reasonable ac-
commodation because it presented a safety hazard and reduced
the efficiency with which the job was to be accomplished.227
It is evident that employers need not fear the burden of ex-
posing their employees to danger, nor worry about increased lia-
bility from hiring individuals with disabilities. Any accommodation
that is a safety hazard is not reasonable and, therefore, is not re-
quired under the ADA.22 1
3. Other Determinations of Reasonableness
Safety is a significant factor involved in determining the rea-
sonableness of accommodations. Yet, safety is not the only limita-
tion on reasonableness. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine
the line between reasonable and unreasonable outside of safety
limits. Under the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Supreme
Court gave some guidance by stating what is not reasonable:
"while a grantee need not be required to make 'fundamental' or
'substantial' modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it
may be required to make 'reasonable' ones."229
Generally, the precedent in this area presents a case-by-case
analysis of what is not reasonable, thereby chipping away at the
employer's duty. The employer is not required to accommodate
225 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987).
226 "Achondroplastic dwarfism is a growth disorder that affects all four extremities
and results in short limbs and short stature." Id. at 1419.
227 Id.
228 Also, an individual with a disability is not qualified if he or she is a direct
threat. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
229 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985). It is important to note that while
there may not be a duty to accommodate employees or prospective employees by funda-
mental or substantial modifications under Title I of the ADA, Title III, Public Accommo-
dations and Services Operated by Private Entities, may require businesses to make those
changes to accommodate a disabled client or the general public.
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the employee's every request,"' or to undergo a major restruc-
turing of the work facilities, 231 or to hire a full-time 'physician
and provide on-site laboratory facilities, 23 2 or to eliminate essen-
tial functions of the job.33 In Southeastern Community College v.
230 Carter v. Bennett, 651 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (D.D.C. 1987), affid, 840 F.2d 63
(D.C. Cir. 1988). A blind employee of the Department of Education was fired for unsat-
isfactory work in answering congressional inquiries. The employee claimed that he had
been transferred to a position that he could not be accommodated to perform. Yet, his
employer provided readers, special equipment and office space, and decreased his work-
load. The employee wanted the reader of his choice, more advanced equipment, easier
access and more office space, but he failed to show the court that these additional ac-
commodations were necessary. The court found that he was reasonably accommodated
and that a blind person so accommodated could perform the essential functions of the
position. The appellate court stated that the only accommodations necessary are those
needed to enable him to perform the essential functions of the position. Id. at 67.
231 Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985). A civil engineering technician
sued the Army Corps of Engineering for denying his request for .assignment to Saudi
Arabia due to his diagnosis as a manic depressive. Although the plaintiffs condition
could be controlled through medication and regular blood tests, the essential prerequi-
sites for treating him did not exist in Al Batin. The court found that the lack of medi-
cal facilities in Saudi Arabia would endanger the plaintiff and his-fellow workers. The
court further found that the Army could not be reasonably required to build a hospital
to accommodate the plaintiff and that anything less would have been inadequate to in-
sure safety. Id. at 1280. See also Rosiak v. United States Dep't of Army, 679 F. Supp.
444 (M.D. Pa. 1987), affid without op., 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1988) (dustless and
fumeless environment could not be provided for person suffeing from hypersensitivity
to inhaled hydrocarbons or "fumes," related chemicals, and dust). The court decided that
because no accommodation was available, although many were tried, the individual was
not an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Id. at 451.
Cf. Marsh v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 173 Mich. App. 72, 433 N.W.2d 820 (1988), ap-
peal denied, 432 Mich. 874 (1989) (accommodation under Michigan law is limited to alter-
ation of physical structure to allow access and modification of peripheral duties to allow
job performance).
232 Gardner, 752 F.2d at 1283-84. The cost of this accommodation, given the nature
of the construction project, would have been unreasonable.
233 Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985). A postal
worker with strabismus (cross-eyes) was not able to work the machine which he was
hired to operate due to his condition. The fact- that he could perform the other job
functions was not enough to satisfy the requirement of ability to perform the essential
functions of the job. The court warned practitioners not to confuse accommodation with
elimination. Id at 1251. See Salmon Pineiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483 ,(D.C. Puerto
Rico 1987) (accommodations considered unreasonable where Navy would have had to
substantially change the duties of a criminal investigator in order to modify the position
for a person with epilepsy). See also Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d
1139, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989). The court stated that if the
record contains a factual basis demonstrating that accommodation would "require a mod-
ification of the essential nature of the program" then the accommodation is not reason-
able. Accommodating a drug user in the 'police department would be a substantial modi-
fication of the essential functions of the job and would cast doubt on the integrity of
the police force. Therefore, the drug using officer cannot be properly accommodated
and is thus not otherwise qualified. Id at 1149.
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Davis,2"4 the Supreme Court found that section 794 of the Re-
habilitation Act does not require an employer to lower or make
substantial modifications of its standards to accommodate individ-
uals with disabilities." 5 The Court acknowledged that "the line
between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal
discrimination against handicapped persons" will not always be
clear.236 For instance, the court may find that a refusal to modi-
fy a program is unreasonable and discriminatory if it stems from
insistence on traditional requirements which are outdated or un-
willingness to incorporate technological advances which could
make accommodations reasonable.
23 7
Other cases under the Rehabilitation Act have limited an
employer's duty by holding that the employer is not required to
make other employees perform part of the work of the employee
with a disability,28 or to provided the individual who has a disabili-
ty with a completely different job.2 9 A Michigan court interpret-
Nevertheless, the court will look at the job description carefully, and in some in-
stances the court has found that the part of the job which would have to be restruc-
tured or eliminated was not a reasonable, necessary, and legitimate requirement of the
job and its elimination would be a reasonable accommodation. See Norcross v. Sneed,
573 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Ark. 1983), aftid, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985) (blind woman
applying for school librarian position which required planning of field trip; driving not
necessary for that function).
234 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
235 Id. at 413. This case involved a deaf. nursing student who was denied admittance
to the college's nursing program because of her hearing impairment. The court found
that the school would have had to make major adjustments to its program to accommo-
date the student, and that some of the accommodations would be contrary to the pur-
pose of the program. Id.
236 Id. at 412.
237 Id. at 412-13.
238 Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussed supra note 149
and accompanying text). It seems inevitable, however, that when nonessential parts of a
job are eliminated to qualify an individual with a disability, another employee will have
to pick up the slack. While that slack legally may not be a part of the individual's job,
in reality, the other employee is doing'work that the individual with the disability would
be doing if that individual did not have a disability. It is, therefore, not completely accu-
rate to say that an employer will not be required to make another employee perform a
part of the work originally assigned to the individual who has a disability. Although one
can argue semantics, this scenario may arise where the job description of the disabled
individual is disputed. See supra Section II(AX2).
239 Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987). The court found a custodian-labor-
er with asthma concededly unable to perform the duties of a custodian which required
exertion and generated dust. Id. at 467. The employer could not be required to reassign
the disabled individual, but he could reapply for a different position. In this case, the
individual did reapply, and the employer did not hire him for reasons unrelated to his
asthma. Id. In Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1990), the disabled individ-
ual argued that he could have been accommodated by giving him part-time work instead
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ing that state's law24° found that the obligation to accommodate
did not require an employer to do everything reasonably neces-
sary to place an employee, who could no longer perform his orig-
inal job due to an injury received on the job, in a new posi-
tion.241
On the other hand, the ADA lists reassignment to another
vacant position as a potential accommodation. 242 This accommoda-
tion is only available to current employees, not to applicants.243
It should be considered only when accommodations for the cur-
rent position are unduly burdensome.244 Furthermore, an em-
ployer need only consider reassignment if the alternative position
is vacant, and if the individual is qualified for the new posi-
tion.
245
Similarly, under Wisconsin law, transfer to a different posi-
tion may be required. In McMullen v. Labor and Industry Review Commis-
sion,246 the court outlined a test to determine whether a transfer
would constitute a reasonable accommodation. The court may
consider the relationship between the two positions, their nature
and physical location, and the ability of the individual with a dis-
ability to perform the responsibilities of the new position.2 47
Such an accommodation may not be inconsistent with the ADA
so long as the relation between the two positions is significant, so
as not to result in significant alteration of the nature of the job,
and no other employee is "bumped."
Nevertheless, it is discriminatory to reassign an individual
of his current full-time position. The court stated that the employer did not have to
create a new job for the individual. "All the City must do is demonstrate that a part-
time schedule would not accommodate Chiari's performance of the job that he is cur-
rently doing." Id. at 318. Fewer hours still would not have enabled him to perform the
essential functions of his current job (due to Parkinson's disease, the construction inspec-
tor could not climb buildings). Id.
Cf. Marsh v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 173 Mich. App. 72, 433 N.W.2d 820 (1988), ap-
peal denied, 432 Mich, 874 (1989) (dutyto accommodate under Michigan law does not
include new job placement or vocational rehabilitation).
240 Michigan Handicapper's Civil Rights Act, MICH. C.L. ANN. § 37.1102 (West 1985
& Supp. 1990).
241 Rancour v. Detroit Edison Co., 150 Mich. App. 276, 388 N.W.2d 336 (1986),
appeal denied, 428 Mich. 860 (1987).
242 Id.
243 Id. An applicant must be qualified for the job for which he or she is applying,
else the applicant should apply for the vacant position for which he or she is qualified.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 148 Wis.2d 270, 434 N.W.2d 830 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
247 Id.
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with a disability for the purpose of limiting or segregating that individu-
al.24 Thus, the new position must be equal in status and pay to
the former position. A lower grade position will only be accept-
able if no other reasonable accommodation would enable the individu-
al with a disability to perform a position of equal status. 249 Fur-
thermore, an employer will not be required to promote an indi-
vidual with a disability solely because no accommodation will qual-
ify him or her for the position held or requested and no other
position of equal status is available. 25 0
The ADA also seems to deviate from prior disability law in
the area of job restructuring. The ADA, section 101(9)(B), specifi-
cally mentions "job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules" as examples of reasonable accommodations. This seems
contrary to some of the interpretations under the Rehabilitation
Act and state laws which do not require an employer to create
new jobs. 25 1 But, the intent in this area appears to be to pro-
vide individuals with disabilities scheduling flexibility, not to elimi-
nate functions of their jobs. The focus is on the job schedule and
not on the nature of the tasks involved with the job. Congress
noted that "[s]ome people with disabilities are denied employment
because they cannot work a standard schedule."2 2 As examples,
Congress mentioned persons with epilepsy who may require con-
stant shifts rather than rotation from night to day shifts,253 per-
sons who depend upon public transportation which is not yet
fully accessible to mobility impaired people, or persons who need
additional unpaid leave days for medical treatment. In light of
this express intent, it does not appear that this section of the
ADA will deviate from the Rehabilitation Act and require em-
ployers to eliminate essential functions of a job, or to arrange a
person's schedule so as to completely alter the nature of the posi-
tion.
This point is expressly stated in the appendix to the ADA




251 See supra notes 239-40.
252 Report from the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, H.R. REP. No.
116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1989).
253 "Bumping" of other employees to accommodate an employee with a disability is
not intended nor required. Report from the Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources, H.R. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1989).
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tial functions of the job.254 Yet, the regulations do indicate that
an employer may be required to reallocate non-essential or mar-
ginal functions of the job.255 As stated previously, an individual
with a disability will not be disqualified from a position because
he or she is unable to perform such peripheral functions. Yet,
such functions presumably will have to be performed by someone
if the workplace is to function efficiently. Thus, an employer may
have to reallocate those nonessential functions to another employ-
ee when the employee with a disability cannot perform them.256
Not surprisingly, the decisions interpreting "reasonable ac-
commodation" are as varied as the situations under which they
arise. For instance, courts have found violations of the Rehabilita-
tion Act when an employer refused to allow a dyslexic applicant
to take an oral general aptitude test instead of a written one as a
prerequisite for employment as a heavy equipment operator,257
and where the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation re-
fused to provide a driver's license to a school bus driver with a
hearing impairment even thought the impairment could be cor-
rected with a hearing aid.258
On the other hand, the court ih Franklin v. United States Post-
al Service259 determined that an individual suffering from para-
noid schizophrenia (a condition controllable by medication) is not
otherwise qualified when that individual does not take medica-
tion.211 The plaintiff-employee was a postal worker who dis-
254 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,595-96 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
255 Id.
256 Id. at 8,596.
257 Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 669 (11th Cir. 1983).
258 Strathie v. Dep't of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983). Cf. Lewis v. Metro.
Transit Comm., 320 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1982) (bus driver with vision impairment not quali-
fied). See also Harrison v. Marsh, 691 F. Supp. 1223 (W.D. Mo. 1988); Bruegging v.
Burke, 696 F. Supp. 674 (D.D.C. 1987), cert. denied, Bruegging v. Wilson, 488 U.S. 1009
(1989); Perez v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 677 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1987), afd with-
out op., 841 F.2d 1120 (3rd Cir. 1988) (lumbosacral sacroiliac sprain with radiculopathy
could have been reasonably accommodated with a straight-back chair, use of an elevator,
and coverage for regular breaks); Trimble v. Carlin, 633 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(knee injury affecting only a few aspect of the relevant job description could have been
reasonably accommodated).
259 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
260 Id. Some state cases have also interpreted the term "otherwise qualified." For
.instance, according to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, a bus driver with significant vi-
sion problems was not otherwise qualified for that occupation. Lewis v. Metro. Transit
Comm., 320 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1982). Also, an employee suffering from paranoia was
qualified because the condition did not effect his work. Chambers v. Illinois Fair Em-
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played antisocial, dangerous, and sometimes illegal behavior while
on the job. The court decided that the best accommodation
would have been for the employee to take her medication. Noting
that the Postal Service had demonstrated the utmost patience
tolerating the employee's behavior, the court determined that her
refusal to take her medication rendered her not only unqualified,
but unwilling to perform the essential functions of the job. Thus,
her dismissal was not discrimination based on her disability.261
In other cases under the Rehabilitation Act, courts have not-
ed that an accommodation will not be reasonable if it requires an
employer essentially to hire two people to do the same job. 62
For instance, where the job consists of interviewing applicants and
filling out forms for them, it would not be reasonable for an em-
ployer to accommodate a person with apraxia2 63 in such a posi-
tion by hiring another to fill out the forms.211 This is an impor-
tant consideration in situations where an accommodation involves
hiring qualified readers or interpreters for blind or deaf individu-
als or individuals with similar disabilities.2 65 In every instance,
the determination of reasonableness depends on the circumstanc-
es of the specific situation.
In addition to these limitations on what is a reasonable ac-
commodation, the Department of Labor has given some guidance
ployment Practices Comm., 96 Ill. App. 3d 884, 422 N.E.2d 130 (1981). See also
Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987) (federal case in which epilepsy did not
prevent employee from performing physical tasks involved in the job).
261 687 F. Supp. 1214. However, a qualified individual with a disability is not re-
quired to accept any accommodation. 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,589 (1991) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.9(d)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). Yet, as this case demonstrates, if the
refused accommodation is necessary to enable the individual to perform the essential
functions of the job, the refusal may render the individual unqualified. Id.
262 E.g., Arenson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1989) (court of appeals acknowl-
edged that "it is beyond the expectations of the Rehabilitation Act that the [agency] be
required to hire another person capable of actually performing Arenson's job." The
court did indicate that it might be acceptable if Arenson only needed someone to proof-
read his work.) See Lindsay, supra note 23, at 341-43.
263 Apraxia is a neurological disorder that results in "an impaired ability to concen-
trate and to simultaneously perform motor and cognitive tasks . . . difficulty with com-
prehending spoken and written language . . . difficulty in acquiring and processing da-
ta . . . poor handwriting skills, poor reading skills and poor organizational skills."
Lindsay, supra note 23, at 341 (quoting Aremon, 879 F.2d 393, 395).
264 The dissent in Aremon noted that a proofreader would not be able to adequately
proofread Arenson's work unless he or she had been present at the interview to make
sure that Arenson had properly taken down the information. 879 F.2d at 399-400
(Whipple, J., dissenting).
265 This type of accommodation is specified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12,102(IXA)-(B) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991).
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as to what factors should be considered in deciding whether an
accommodation is reasonable or not:
(1) The overall size of the agency's program with respect to
the number of employees, number and type of facilities and
budget; (2) the type of agency operation, including the compo-
sition and structure of the agency's work force; and (3) the
nature and the cost of the accommodation.2f
While these guidelines are directed at government agencies under
the Rehabilitation Act, they are nearly identical to the factors list-
ed in the ADA's definition of reasonable accommodation. 267 In
general, both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act regulations indicate
that more will be expected of larger companies with larger bud-
gets. This is an issue which will be handled under the consider-
ation of undue hardships discussed below.261 Once again, the
court will have to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an
accommodation is reasonable under the circumstances, taking into
consideration not only the disabled individuals and the jobs they
seek, but also the financial means and the nature of the employer
and its business as well.269
The entire analysis requires the trial court to make adequate
findings of fact.27 ° Each element involves a factual inquiry which
will differ from case to case.27
The court is obligated to scrutinize the evidence before
determining whether the defendant's justifications reflect a well
informed judgement grounded in a careful and open-minded
weighing of the risks and alternatives, or whether they are
simply conclusory statements that are being used to justify re-
flexive reactions grounded in ignorance or capitulation to pub-
266 Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 32.13 (1990); 29 C.F.R. §
1613.704(c) (1990).
267 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,111(1OXB) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb 1991).
268 See infra Part III.
269 For this reason many fear that the ADA will become a "free-for-all." See Barnard,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST.
JoHN's L REv. 229, 252 (1990); A Big Big Mistake, Pitt. Press, Oct. 3, 1990, at B2, col.
4 (ADA offers "considerable room for mischief").
270 See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (court erred by failing to
consider evidence that any necessary accommodation would be simple and inexpensive).
Note that one court has found that where the uncontradicted facts before an employer
indicate that an employee was not otherwise qualified, the employer was not guilty of
discrimination even though those facts were later proved erroneous. Walker v. Atty. Gen.
of the United States, 572 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1983).
271 See Chin, supra note 29, § 14.04[4].
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lic prejudice.sn
Note, however, that courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act
have stated that the issue of whether an employer provided a reason-
able accommodation is a mixed question of law and fact.
273
Thus on review, courts will view the fact determinations under a
clearly erroneous standard, but the question of whether an em-
ployer satisfied the reasonable accommodation mandate is a legal
determination "subject to more rigid appellate scrutiny."274
The broad definition of reasonable accommodation, coupled
with the vast range of disabilities subject to the reasonable accom-
modation requirement, makes the duty appear formidable to em-
ployers. But the ADA does not require employers to lower their
standards nor to hire individuals who are unqualified or unable to
perform the essential functions of the job. The result in the
workplace, therefore, should not be negative as some employers
fear. Furthermore, the means to compliance with the ADA and
employment of individuals with disabilities will not be unduly bur-
densome to employers, as the following Section shows.
III. WHEN ACCOMMODATIONS CREATE AN UNDUE BURDEN
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, wrote of the
Rehabilitation Act that "[a]ny interpretation of § 504 must . . . be
responsive to two powerful but countervailing considerations-the
need to give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to
keep § 504 within manageable bounds."275 The same might be
said of the ADA. Congress appears to have drafted the ADA with
an ear to the Supreme Court's statement. Within the broad state-
ment of the rights of Americans with disabilities, Congress includ-
ed limitations which are intended to curb the potential adverse
effects the ADA may have on some employers. 76 Specifically,
272 Arline v.. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 764-65 (11th Cir. 1985),
afftd, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th
Cir. 1988).
273 Carter v. Bennet, 840 F.2d 63, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) ("questions in which . . . the issue is whether the
facts satisfy the statutory standard" are mixed).
274 Carter v. Bennet, 840 F.2d at 65.
275 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (addressing the question of wheth-
er Congress intended § 504 to encompass all claims of disparate-impact discrimination).
276 Certainly some will argue that these limits are drawn with terms which will in ef-
fect increase the burden of the ADA by forcing litigation over their meanings. See, eg.,
Barnard, supra note 4.
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these limitations include the reasonableness requirement for ac-
commodations discussed above and the employer's defense of un-
due hardship.
Under the ADA, as under the Rehabilitation Act and many
state disability laws, an employer will not be required to accom-
modate an employee or applicant with a disability if the necessary
accommodation "would impose an undue hardship on the opera-
tion of the business."277 The ADA states that an undue hardship
is "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" when consid-
ered with several specified factors. 278 Those factors are:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under
this 'Act;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such ac-
commodation upon the operation of'the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to
the number of its employees; the number, type, and location
of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, adminis-
277 42 U.S.C.s. § 12,112(b)(5)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991). See Report from the
Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at
70 (1990) (on the relation between sections using terms "undue hardship" and "reason-
able accommodation"). See also 29 C.F.R. 1613.704(a) (1990) (regulation regarding undue
hardship under the Rehabilitation Act). Cf. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,994 (West 1,980 &
Supp. 1991) (no duty "to make any accommodation for an employee who has a physical
handicap that would produce undue hardship to the employer); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 722(6)(e) (1985 & Supp. 1990) (employer not required to "[m]ake any changes that
would impose on the employer an undue hardship, provided that the costs of less than
5 percent of an employee's salary or annualized wage ... shall be presumed not to be
an undue hardship"); Michigan Handicapper's Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.1102.102(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990) (accommodation required "unless the person
demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship"); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 28-1-7(J) (1987 & Supp. 1989) (it is discriminatory for "any employer to refuse
or fail to accommodate . . . an individual's physical or mental handicap . . . unless such
accommodation is unreasonable or an undue hardship")" Wis. STAT. § 111.34(1)(b) (1988
& Supp. 1990) (it is discriminatory to refuse to accommodate "unless the employer can
demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer's program,
enterprise or business"). All of the above are statutes which require the employer to
provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals -with, disabilities.
278 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(1)) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
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trative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in ques-
tion to the covered entity.
Note the similarity between these factors and those outlined in
the regulations concerning whether an accommodation is reason-
able or not.2 ° If an accommodation presents an undue hard-
ship on the operation of the business, it will not be reason-
able.28 1 But, as noted above, there are many other factors which
will render an accommodation unreasonable. 2 2 Thus, although
it may not create an undue hardship, an accommodation may be
unreasonable.
Nonetheless, the consideration of an accommodation's effect
on the business is an integral part of a finding of reasonableness.
This is the most significant protection afforded businesses by the
ADA, and it is also the primary reason why the fear that this Act
will destroy small businesses is unfounded.8 3 Courts will give
great weight to the effect on the business in determining whether
an employer has violated the Act by failing to accommodate. If an
employer can show that providing an accommodation would im-
pose an undue hardship on the operation of the business, such
showing may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under
the ADA.2 4 However, personnel should be aware that the better
279 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,111(10XB) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578,
8,588 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(2)) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
280 See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
281 See, eg., Carr v. Gen. Motors Corp., 135 Mich. App. 226, 353 N.W.2d 489 (1984),
rev'd, 425 Mich. 313, 389 N.W.2d 686 (1986) (duty to accommodate person whose handi-
cap is job related unless it imposes undue hardship); Wardlow v. Great Lakes Express
Co., 128 Mich. App. 54, 339 N.W.2d 670 (1983) (trial court erred by failing to consider
employer's duty to accommodate driver with back problems who requested "over-the-
road" work and case remanded giving employer burden of showing that to do so would
be an undue burden).
282 See generally supra Part II.
283 This section was a compromise in the ADA. The original draft required reason-
able accommodation unless the accommodation would threaten the existence of the
employer's business; the so-called "bankruptcy" provision. See Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1989: Hearings before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on
the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1989). See also Tucker, supra note 2, at 927.
That obviously would have been a much harder standard to meet, and is also evidence
that undue hardship means something less than threatened existence.
For a detailed discussion of the economic impact of the ADA see the Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis, 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,579 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
284 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,591 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.15(d))
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991). When one accommodation is unduly burdensome, there may
be others which are also reasonable and adequate, but are not unduly burdensome. In
that situation, the employer will be required to provide the alternative accommodation.
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off a covered entity is financially, the harder it will be to show an
undue hardship, at least economically. This is especially true of
large businesses or franchises which have more than one location.
In such a situation, employers and courts may face the issue of
whose financial resources should be considered, the individual
facility where the individual with a disability seeks employment or
the entire corporation. Generally, the resources of the entire cor-
poration will be considered.285 But this issue will depend upon
the relationship between the facility and the covered entity as a
whole. In some situations, the particular facility or site may have
very limited access to the financial resources of the whole. In
those cases, an account of the resources of the entire entity
would be inappropriate." 6
Some fear that the accommodation costs required under the
ADA will be significant." 7 Furthermore, as the determinations
under the ADA will be made on a case-by-case basis, employers
will have to guess at how a court might interpret the above fac-
tors in their case. 288 Fearing the consequences of a wrong guess,
"employers will err on the side of caution and will stretch their
resources " 2s1 to accommodate their employees who have disabili-
ties.
Another twist in the cost analysis of undue hardship stems
from a Senate statement, reaffirmed in the ADA regulations, indi-
cating that employers need to investigate outside sources which
may be available to alleviate the cost of accommodating employ-
The fact that one possible accommodation is unduly burdensome is not a complete de-
fense for the employer. Id.
285 Id. at 8,596 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
286 Id.
287 See Lindsay, supra note 23, at 340 (The holding in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977), that an employer is not obligated to incur more than a de minimis expense
is "dead letter with respect to an employer's obligations under the ADA.") That case in-
volved accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs under Tide VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
The House Committee clearly stated that the standard under the ADA is significant-
ly higher than that expressed by the Supreme Court in Hardison, and that that case is
not applicable to the ADA. This was deemed necessary due to the "crucial role that
reasonable accommodation plays in ensuring meaningful employment opportunities for
people with disabilities." Report form the Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 68-69 (1990).
288 As in the Rehabilitation Act, the burden is on the employer to show an undue
hardship. Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 3, at 40-42 (1990).
289 Lindsay, supra note 23, at 342.
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ees with disabilities.2 If an outside agency, for instance the
State Vocational Rehabilitation Agency, is available to pay for a
portion of the accommodation, then the employer will be re-
quired to pay the portion of the cost which would not impose an
undue hardship. 91 This will increase the paperwork and transac-
tional costs involved in hiring an employee with significant needs
for accommodation by adding the need to research the benefits
available to the individual and outside agencies that are willing to
help. However, the number of persons requiring significant ac-
commodations is low, and the situations foreseen by the oppo-
nents of the ADA in this area will probably be the exceptions to
the usual scenario.292
While the complex cases will probably be rare, even in the
simpler cases the determination of undue hardship will have to be
decided on a case-by-case basis according to the particular facts
involved. Undue hardship is a factual determination. The weight
given to each express factor varies depending upon the facts of
the particular situation and "turns on both the nature and cost of
the accommodation in relation to the employer's resources and
operations."23 The list of factors reflects the flexible approach
of the Rehabilitation Act, which has been operating for over sev-
enteen years. The factors are all relative to one another. Thus, an
accommodation which may seem burdensome in the abstract may
not be so when considered in light of the factors listed.294
Furthermore, the list of factors to be considered is not exclu-
290 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1989). See also Report from the Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, H.R. REp. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 68-
69 (1990) (House Committee in accord); 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,596 (1991) (to be codi-
fied at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991).
291 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1989). See 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,596
(1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2[) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991). Failure to
receive technical assistance does not relieve an employer from compliance with the ADA.
Id. at 8,589 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.9(c)).
292 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also Fagin, McAvoy, & Dorman, New
Federal Legislation Creates Challenges, Benefits for Business, Nat'l LJ., Sept. 3, 1990, at 18,
col. 2 (not all accommodations are expensive and many cost less than fifty dollars).
293 Report from the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, H.R. REP. No.
116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1989). This section is designed as a response to fears
that the need to undertake significant investments to comply with this law would compel
business operating in depressed regions or operating at the margin or at a loss to fold
rather than comply. Congress does not intend the ADA to "result in the closure of
neighborhood stores or in the loss of jobs." Report from the Committee on the Judicia-
ry, S. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 40-42 (1990).
294 Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 3, at 40-42 (1990).
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sive. Courts and administrators may consider other relevant fac-
tors appropriate to a given situation. Some additional factors ex-
pressed by Congress include the number of employees or appli-
cants potentially benefitting from an accommodation, 295 the avail-
ability of outside funding,21 or the applicant's willingness to pay
the portion of the accommodation which would be burdensome
to the employer.
297
The factors considered in determining undue hardship under
the ADA are the same ones used in section 794 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act.298 Under the Rehabilitation Act the courts have stated
that the determination of undue hardship "is highly fact spe-
cific." 29 9 The court is required to make a specific inquiry in
each case to "ensure that the employer's justifications reflect a
well-informed judgment grounded in a careful and open-minded weigh-
ing of the risks and alternatives. "3°°
The court in Dexler v. Tisch,30 ' discussed two of the factors
outlined in the regulations under the Rehabilitation Act and in
the ADA. In light of the facts of that case, the court considered
the type of operation involved and the nature and costs of accom-
modation. In Dexter, a postal service employee with
achondroplastic dwarfism was denied .a position with the postal
service due to his disability.0 2 He asserted that his disability
could be accommodated by restructuring the position or by pro-
295 Congress noted that the very nature of an accommodation is individualized; it
enables a specific person with a specific disability to perform a specific job. Thus, the
fact that an accommodation benefits only one person is not a negative consideration
that would prompt a finding of undue hardship. Report from the Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 68-69 (1990).
296 An entity which is eligible for outside funding or tax credits must take those
monies into consideration when determining the undue hardship. The employer should
only consider the net cost of the accommodation. Also, lack of outside funding is not a
defense to the duty to accommodate. Id.
297 Id.
298 Compare 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,111(1OXB) (Law. Co-op. Supp. Feb. 1991) to 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.12(c) (1990) (DHHS regulation). Congress has stated that this provision is based on
and should be interpreted consistently with the regulations implementing sections 791
and 794 of the Rehabilitation Act. Report from the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1989).
299 Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1988) (lower
court failed to make an individualized inquiry on the issue of accommodation and un-
due hardship).
300 Id. at 1080 (quoting Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 765
(11th Cir. 1985), affd, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
301 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987).
302 Id. at 1420. See also supra notes 167-70.
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viding a three hundred dollar footstool, thereby enabling him to
perform the job."-3
The court first considered the feasibility of restructuring the
position. The type of operation involved is deadline oriented and
"task oriented."30 4 If the postal service restructured his job to
eliminate certain tasks, then Mr. Dexler would have nothing to do
at some times and too little to do at others.0 5 This would be
unduly burdensome due to the heavy flow of mail through the
facility and the need for every individual to work a full load at all
times."' Furthermore, hiring a taller person to assist Mr. Dexler
would be burdensome "doubling up."30 7
The court next considered the step stool accommodation.
While the above problems could be eliminated by the provision
of a step stool, that accommodation is also burdensome. The step
stool would create an undue burden because it would fail to elimi-
nate the inefficiency in Mr. Dexler's job performance.308  It
would take time for him to move the stool from place to place as
needed, and while the actual cost of the stool is minimal, the cost
in terms of lost efficiency is greater.3 9 Also, the stool presents a
safety risk which not only makes unreasonable, but unduly bur-
densome as well.310
The court finally noted that "[w]hile none of these hardships
is conclusive or overwhelming, taken together they demonstrate
that accommodating Mr. Dexler would unduly interfere with the
operation of the New Britain Post Office."31' Thus, the determi-
nation of undue hardship involves a broad inquiry. Courts will
not take a narrow view of an employer's situation and mandate
compliance with the ADA simply because the employer is finan-
cially able to do so. Precedent indicates that courts look at all
relevant circumstances. While this broad inquiry is likely to gener-
ate litigation, it provides a significant protection for employers.
Generally, courts will measure undue hardship by the econom-
ic burden the duty imposes. 12 However, as Dexler illustrates,
303 Id. at 1423-24.
304 Id. at 1428.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. See supra Part I(B)(2).
311 Id. at 1429.
312 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (cost of employ-
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courts have also considered administrative burdens,"'3 the bur-
den of "doubling up" where manpower is limited, 14 the burden
of increased safety risks, 15 impediments to the basic functioning
of an organization, 16 and the burden of continuing to change
accommodations as an employee's condition worsens.
31 7
The appendix to the ADA regulations mention other non-
financial burdens which may render an accommodation unrea-
sonable or which an employer may use as a defense. In addition
to accommodations which would be unduly costly, the regulations
consider those which would be unduly extensive, substantial, or
disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature or opera-
tion of the business.318 As an example, the appendix mentions
that a nightclub will not have to switch from dim lighting to
bright lighting to accommodate an individual with a vision impair-
ment if doing so would destroy the ambiance of the club.319
Congress mentioned specifically in the context of the ADA
that special circumstances of a particular employer should be con-
sidered when determining whether a reasonable accommodation
would present an undue hardship.3s2 As an example, Congress
ing readers for blind employees was not an undue hardship considering the size of the
state department's administrative operating budget). See also Coleman v. Casey County
Bd. of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (bus driver with one leg qualified to
drive with minimal accommodations which were not a burden on the school board since
the state Bureau of Rehabilitation Services would provide the necessary accommodations
without cost). But cf., Gloss v. Geheral Motors Corp., 138 Mich. App. 281, 360 N.W.2d
596 (1984) (applying the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Law finding that employer
was not confined to introducing a cost analysis specific to employee's situation to prove
an undue burden of accommodation).
313 442 U.S. at 412 (individual is not otherwise qualified if accommodation would
result in undue administrative burden).
314 Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983) (where park technician
with heart problems could not perform all of the functions of a job, and accommoda-
tion would require other technicians to perform part of his duty, the doubling up would
be an undue hardship on the employer given the limited resource of employees).
315 See generally, supra Part I(B)(2).
316 Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988), afftd, 865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.
1989) (FBI not required to accommodate special agents with diabetes by placing them
on permanent limited duty since that would, among other things, impede the basic func-
tions of the FBI).
317 Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd without op., 888 F.2d 1385
(4th Cir. 1989) (labor relations specialist's abilities and restrictions were-no longer com-
patible with potential job opportunities in the department despite past accommodations,
and the agency could not be forced to endure hardship of further accommodations).
318 56 Fed. Reg. 8,578, 8,596 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2) (pro-
posed Feb. 28, 1991).
319 Id.
320 Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
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mentioned the special circumstances the construction industry
faces with certain types of temporary worksites. In such a circum-
stance it may be unduly burdensome to require physical alter-
ations to accommodate. For example, accommodations for an
individual in a wheelchair would be unduly burdensome when the
terrain of the site changes daily. 21 On the other hand, the same
alteration may be reasonable for a permanent office building.
One major difference between the ADA and the Rehabilita-
tion Act is the influence of collective bargaining agreements or
labor contracts. Agreements and contracts which conflict with the
duties under the ADA may be considered as one factor in deter-
mining reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Yet, un-
der the Rehabilitation Act, such considerations were almost always
defenses. 22 In other words, if the duty to provide accommoda-
tion to employ an individual with a disability conflicts with the
employer's obligation under the collective bargaining agreement,
that factor is no longer an absolute defense to the duty to accom-
modate. Yet, the courts and the employer may still take those
agreements into consideration when deciding the scope of the
employer's obligation under the ADA.
While some place great weight on the word "may" as an indi-
cation that the ADA will encourage courts to disregard collective
Sess., pt. 3, at 40-42 (1990).
321 Id. See Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1991) (professional engineer
with Parkinson's disease not qualified to be construction inspector due to safety risks).
This factor should put to rest the fears of individuals who commented on the "mischief"
to be done by the ADA in cases such as that of Donald Keister in Baltimore, Maryland.
Mr. Keister is a 640 pound building contractor whose work is hindered by his
weight-he says he falls through floorboards at construction sites. A Big Big Mistake, Pitt.
Press, Oct 3, 1990, at B2, col. 4 (expressing the fear that when Mr. Keister brings an
action under the ADA he will be declared a "minority" and the City of Baltimore, which
grants a percentage of its contracts to minorities, will have to give him a contract).
While this situation involves an interesting interplay between the ADA and the law of
government contracts which deserves more attention, it is also a prime example of how
the fears expressed by opponents of the ADA are unrealistic. The ADA does declare in-
dividuals with disabilities to be "minorities," 42 U.S.C.S. § 12,101(a)(7) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. Feb. 1991), and this potentially places them within the class of persons to whom
Baltimore must award 25% of its contracts. Nevertheless, the ADA is not intended to
affect the rights and remedies available under current state and federal statutes. Law and
Explanation, supra note 33, at 43. Furthermore, the ADA does not function to protect
every individual with disabilities in every situation, it protects "otherwise qualified individ-
uals with disabilities." So it is possible that Mr. Keister will be declared a member of a
class of minorities for the purposes of the ADA, but if he should bring an action under
this act, the fundamental question that the ADA addresses is whether he is qualified for
the job he seeks.
322 See, e.g., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1989).
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bargaining agreemens;s 11 such fears are mere conjecture. Since
the Senate also suggested thit future conflicts be avoided by en-
suring that agreements entered into after the ADA was enacted
allow for compliance with the law, there is equal room to specu-
late that the Senate expected existing agreements to continue to
be valid defenses to compliance. Thus,' such agreements may be
defenses where they existed prior to the enactment of the ADA,
but future agreements will not be considered. 2 4
Generally, this area' of the Act should Work to calm the fears
of businesses as it was included in the spirit of compromise.
While the employer's duty inder the ADA is broad in scope, the
limitations built into- the Act are designed to prevent undue hard-
ship on businesses. An employer will not be required to hire an
individual who is not qualified for the position, and the employer
will not have'to provide accommodations which are unnecessary
oi unreasonable-and unreasonable includes those which are too
expensive for the business to bear, as well as those which disrupt
the functioning or the purposes of the business.
IV. -CONCLUSION
Under Title I of the ADA, a covered employer cannot dis-
criminate against an "otherwise qualified individual with a disabili-
ty." A person is "otherwise qualified" if he or she can perform
the essential functions of a job with or without "reasonable ac-
commodations." The employer is required to provide reasonable
accommodations unless doing so imposes an undue hardship on
the operation of the business.
The ADA-will guarantee rights for individuals with disabilities
which have been available for over twenty, years to other groups
of people who have traditionally been victims of discrimination.
Yet the scope of this anti-discrimination law is significantly differ-
ent from others because i t, includes an affirmative duty for em-
ployers to accommodate the disabilities of employees or appli-
cants. It is this difference which has caused controversy over a law
which is designed to eradicate a social evil. The controversy cen-
ters not only on money, but also on safety and administrative bur-
dens. The fear is .that the duty to hire individuals with disabilities
323 See Lindsay, supra note 23, at 343;-
324 See the second category of discrimination under Title I of the ADA, supra note
15 and accompanying text.
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who are capable of performing the essential requirements of the
jobs in question, especially when those individuals require accom-
modations, will prove to be so costly and burdensome as to de-
stroy small businesses.
Under the ADA, however, these economic concerns should
not manifest themselves into unjust realities because the ADA has
built-in limits that were drawn with an eye to protect business and
to alleviate those fears. For instance, an individual must be quali-
fied for the position sought, accommodations must be reasonable,
and accommodations will not be reasonable if they are financially
burdensome, unsafe, or burdensome in other ways which impair
the operation of the business. Thus, the ADA is unlikely to crip-
ple American businesses as it emancipates individuals with disabili-
ties.
The only criticism of the Act which is likely to manifest itself
is the flood of litigation which will be necessary to interpret its
meaning. But legislation has always been, and always should be,
subject to judicial interpretation. Furthermore, the class of people
with disabilities who need protection is so broad and varied, as is
the range of jobs sought by these individuals, that the legislature
could not possibly predict and provide for every factual situation.
Such an act needs breadth and flexibility for its medicine to work
on a pervasive social ill.
Counselors to employers ought to recognize that the courts
will likely interpret the ADA in accord with the ADA regulations,
and also with a view to the voluminous federal and state case law
already existing from the Rehabilitation Act and state acts. With
such guidance, employers should successfully arrange their affairs
to satisfy the requirements of the ADA.
Lisa A. Lavelle
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